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Abstract 
This paper brings together contributions from a cross-section of EU member states 
and the Gallup World Poll survey on the question of how Germany is being viewed at 
this time of economic and political crisis. Even if the findings suggest that EU 
members are not as critical of Germany as they have been in recent years, German 
diplomacy must improve. In the heavily intergovernmentalised setting of EU 
decision-making today, there is talk of a “constant German EU Presidency”, which 
calls for a degree of inward coordination and outward-looking consultation from 
Berlin. Second, members of ‘core Europe’ have traditionally balanced their relations 
with Germany through close ties with member states now relegated to a second tier 
of European integration. Berlin’s closest partners are deeply nervous about these 
developments. Third, Germany’s current weight reflects only the conjuncture of 
extraordinary domestic and international economic factors. The way that Germany 
and the other member states behave towards one another now will have implications 
for their own treatment long after this moment has passed. In short, the ‘Union 
method’ and ‘multi-speed integration’ are already being used to excuse exclusion and 
fragmentation within the EU. Germany, at the heart of these developments, badly 
needs to develop a new style of interaction, before it too falls victim to these trends. 
This present paper is designed to help it do so. 
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Foreword 
hen I was a member of the European Commission from 1999 to 2004, I saw the 
evolution of Germany’s role very clearly within the EU. At that time, Germany was 
experiencing a kind of ‘normalisation’: Gerhard Schröder was the first chancellor to 
be born after the Second World War and he dared to assert that Germany had its own national 
interests which were not necessarily congruent with European ones. ‘German power’ was back. 
I remember too that during the Nice Treaty negotiations in December 2000, Germany managed 
to impose on the other member states, and especially on France, a ‘breaking of ranks’ that 
ensured that the number of German MEPs was aligned with its status as the Union’s largest 
member state. It also maintained a hard line during negotiations for the EU multiannual 
financial framework (2007-2014). Finally, Germany played a key role in the EU’s 2004-2007 
enlargement to Eastern and Central European countries, which was in line with its interests in 
the region.  
As a commissioner, I also experienced Germany’s political system and its potential impact on 
European affairs. Whereas the EU Council meetings then gathered 15 EU ministers, I met 
several times in Germany with ministers from each of the 16 Länder in charge of Justice and 
Home Affairs. The principles of subsidiarity and competence-sharing are very well known in 
Germany compared with the EU level. I had the opportunity to represent the Commission, 
together with Michel Barnier, at the Convention on the Future of Europe in 2001-2002 and I can 
very clearly remember how the German representatives tried to give greater weight to both of 
those principles within the European Union’s new framework. Their wish to adopt a catalogue 
of competences was rejected but, as regards the “shared competences”, they obtained a clearer 
definition of the content of the European interventions. 
As a Portuguese citizen, my experience of Germany’s management of the sovereign debt crisis 
might be slightly different. Indeed, the German government has been very critical of several 
other member states, including my own. But one has to be aware of the huge evolution of 
Germany’s position on financial assistance and economic governance during the Greek crisis 
and beyond. In fact, during the EU Convention, Germany was strongly opposed even to 
addressing the question of what economic governance might look like at the EU level; a decade 
later, it was Germany that took the initiative to promote a legal framework based on fiscal 
discipline. It might be insufficient in terms of coordinating national economic policies to fight 
against competitiveness unbalances, but it is nevertheless a very relevant evolution. 
Germany’s problem is not so much that it is generally right about the need for fiscal discipline 
but that it has to learn how to be right: this is the most difficult issue to manage from a political 
standpoint. German ordoliberalism  calls for stringency, austerity, and fiscal consolidation 
measures, but economic growth is also necessary to reassure markets and minimise the negative 
effects of recession. German leaders finally understand this fact, as proven by the ‘redemption 
pact’ proposed by the ‘Five Wise Men’ and by recent public statements about inflation in the 
eurozone and about the evolution of German domestic demand. 
To a certain extent, we can say that Berlin is increasingly imposing its economic preferences on 
others in the eurozone. But if we also enjoyed its level of economic success, wouldn’t we also 
be tempted to persuade others of the merits of our own methods? 
As president of Notre Europe, an organisation with a truly pan-European vision, I would like to 
underline that there is no doubt that Germany still wants to be strongly anchored to the 
European project. Chancellor Merkel’s declarations are very clear in this regard, and she is even 
calling for further EU integration, as one can see from the resolutions adopted in the last CDU 
party congress, as well as in many of her other recent speeches. 
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Germany is experiencing its ‘unipolar moment’ in Europe: the German government and 
administration are not yet wholly comfortable with this situation, which carries dangers for the 
cohesion and consistency of the European project. Germany, in foreign policy as well as in 
economics, can exert decisive leadership in the EU, but it has to want this. All other member 
states recognise the de facto leadership position of Germany, but it is often reluctant to assume 
the full range of consequences. Moreover, Germany has to be careful not to turn its back on its 
European partners when using economic means to pursue its foreign policy ends.  
The great interest of the EPIN Working Paper on “Germany as viewed by the other member 
states” lies in its presentation of the various member states’ attitudes towards Germany. It 
enables readers to draw several interesting conclusions and allows for EU countries to be sorted 
into several categories: 
Many northern and eastern European countries are rather positive towards Germany’s attitude 
during the crisis. These countries tend to be very closely connected with Germany economically 
and/or have very similar cultural standards. Many eastern European countries also remember 
that Germany played a key role in favour of EU enlargement after the end of communism. 
On the other hand, southern European countries are rather critical of the German attitude. They 
sometimes express very strong criticism, as they did in the case of Greece, where “Germany is 
synonymous with evil and responsible for the Greek tragedy.” These countries were strongly 
affected by the crisis and did not accept what they perceived as a lack of German solidarity 
during parts of the eurozone crisis. 
Finally, I think it is worth noting the case of France, not only because of the special relations 
between both countries, but also because it is often said that if Germany and France can agree, 
then all countries will agree. Culturally, France is, contrary to Germany, close to the southern 
European countries in several ways. But both countries need each other: Germany needs France 
to legitimate its decisions whereas France needs Germany to carry on playing a key role in 
European affairs. The ‘Merkozy’ tandem has been heavily criticised: they tried to find solutions 
to address the crisis but it would have been much wiser if they had been more open to other EU 
countries and paid more attention to the role of European institutions. 
The new French President François Hollande is very aware of the importance of the German-
French relationship and made a point of making his first foreign visit as president to Germany to 
meet Chancellor Merkel. Even though they might not have the same priorities, austerity vs. 
growth, they both tend to have a consensus-building attitude. This could be very useful in 
addressing the ongoing crisis in the eurozone, in as much as President Hollande also insists on 
including EU institutions and other EU member states, which delights me. Beyond the financial 
and economic crisis, the EU is also suffering a crisis of confidence and Germany still has a 
major role to play in resolving it. 
António Vitorino 
President of Notre Europe 
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Changes in the Image of Germany – 2006 to 2011: 
Evidence from the Gallup World Poll 
Nicolas Scharioth
* 
ata from the Gallup World Poll reveals that Germany’s leadership enjoys high levels of 
approval in most EU countries and that it compares favourably to perceptions of 
leadership in relation to France or the UK. So far, in most states approval of German 
leadership has benefited since the onset of the financial crisis, except in Greece, where support 
for German leadership has plummeted in recent years.  
Since the start of the eurozone crisis, there has been renewed interest in the question of German 
leadership. Germany’s European partners are seeking the country’s leadership in solving the 
continent’s economic and financial problems. At the same time, perceived German dominance 
has led to fears of a rise in anti-German sentiment in crisis-stricken countries. While media 
attention has focused on high-profile reactions such as flag burnings
1 or Nazi caricatures in 
newspapers,
2 less is known about how widespread such sentiments are across Europe. 
Gallup World Poll - methodology 
Data collected as part of the Gallup World Poll can shed light on this question since the survey 
regularly asks respondents to evaluate the leadership of various major world or regional powers. 
This includes Germany, France and the United Kingdom. The question Gallup uses is 
formulated so as to encompass a general assessment of leadership – not specific to a policy area 
or region: “Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of 
[COUNTRY]?”  
Gallup has collected data on such questions since 2006 in 160 countries around the world – 
including all 27 EU member states. The World Poll is conducted each year with a random 
sample of a minimum of 1,000 people in each country and the results are post-stratified by 
demographic characteristics to ensure that they are representative. Results are based on face-to-
face and telephone interviews with adults in each EU member state between 2006 and 2011. For 
results based on each sample of national adults, one can say with 95% confidence that the 
maximum margin of sampling error ranges from ±3.5 percentage points to ±4 percentage points. 
The margin of error reflects the influence of data weighting. In addition to sampling error, 
question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into 
the findings of public opinion polls.
3 The data presented here allow for a detailed analysis of 
                                                      
* Dr. Nicolas Scharioth is a Consultant at Gallup Europe (nicolas_scharioth@gallup-europe.be). 
Gallup copyright statement: “This document contains proprietary research, copyrighted materials, and 
literary property of Gallup Europe. It is for the guidance of your company only and is not to be copied, 
quoted, published, or divulged to others outside of your organisation. Gallup® is the trademark of Gallup, 
Inc. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners. This document is of great value to 
both your organisation and Gallup. Accordingly, international and domestic laws and penalties 
guaranteeing patent, copyright, trademark, and trade secret protection protect the ideas, concepts, and 
recommendations related within this document. No changes may be made to this document without the 
express written permission of Gallup Europe.” 
1 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gi3mNDWkb4w.  
2 See Der Spiegel ( http://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/when-in-doubt-call-them-nazis-ugly-
stereotypes-of-germany-resurface-in-greece-a-817995.html).  
3 For more complete methodology and specific survey dates, see Gallup's Country Data Set details. 
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how perceptions of the leadership of Germany and other European powers have changed since 
the beginning of the crisis. 
Figure 1 presents an overview of sentiment regarding Germany’s leadership. The data –
collected in the most recent wave in 2011– reveal that approval for the German leadership’s job 
performance is above 50% in 15 EU member states, with approval surpassing two-thirds in 
three states: the Netherlands (72%), Hungary (69%), and Finland (68%).  
The proportion of those who approve of Germany’s leadership is much higher than those who 
disapprove, by a strong margin in all EU member states, with two exceptions: Greece and 
Cyprus (in the latter approval and disapproval is divided almost equally). In Greece, disapproval 
(66%) of German leadership heavily outweighs approval (21%). In general, there is an inverse 
relationship between the approval of a country’s leadership and the inability to answer the 
question (the rate of “don’t know” rises from 19% in the Netherlands to 71% in Malta). Greece, 
with 13%, is the exception to this rule, signalling that almost everybody has a strong opinion on 
the issue. 
It is informative to compare the results from 2011 with data gathered in 2006, before the start of 
the current crisis. The columns on the right of Table 1 denote the approval rates for 2006 and 
the ‘swing’ in opinion since then. In seven EU countries, the balance of approval to disapproval 
has shifted significantly towards approval. Some strong five-year shifts can be seen in Spain 
(+35%), France (+16%), Hungary (+15%), Italy (+13%), Poland (+10%), and Denmark (+9%). 
Interestingly, this list includes many of the larger EU states. In 16 member states, sentiment has 
stayed more or less the same between 2006 and 2011. In three European countries, attitudes 
towards German leadership show a sharp drop in approval rates. The most striking example is 
Greece (-17% swing since 2006), Luxembourg (-12%) and Latvia (-9%).  
Table 1. Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of Germany? 
Country Approval 
2011 
Disapproval 
2011 
DK/Refused 
2011 
Approval 
2006* 
% Swing 
2011-2006 
Netherlands 72%  9%  19%  72%  ±0% 
Hungary 69%  6%  25%  54%  +15% 
Finland 68%  13%  19%  68%  ±0% 
Lithuania 59%  10%  31%  54%  +5% 
France 59%  15%  26%  43%  +16% 
Luxembourg 59%  19%  22%  71%  -12% 
Denmark 58%  11%  31%  49%  +9% 
Slovenia 58%  15%  27%  63%  -5% 
Spain 58%  16%  26%  23%  +35% 
Romania 57%  6%  37%  53%  +4% 
Austria 56%  22%  22%  58%  -2% 
Bulgaria 55%  8%  37%  57%  -2% 
Estonia 53%  11%  36%  49%  +4% 
Slovakia 53%  14%  33%  14%  +39% 
Ireland 53%  15%  32%  49%  +4% 
Latvia 49%  15%  36%  58%  -9% 
Belgium 47%  15%  38%  47%  ±0% 
Czech Republic  47%  15%  38%  45%  +2% 
United Kingdom**  43%  11%  46%  42%  +1% CHANGES IN THE IMAGE OF GERMANY –2006-2011: EVIDENCE FROM THE GALLUP WORLD POLL | 3 
 
Italy 42%  17%  41%  29%  +13% 
Poland 42%  24%  34%  32%  +10% 
Sweden 34%  11%  55%  33%  +1% 
Portugal 30%  15%  55%  29%  +1% 
Cyprus 28%  24%  48%  32%  -4% 
Malta 23%  6%  71%  23%  ±0% 
Greece 21%  66%  13%  38%  -17% 
Notes: Sorted by approval, swings statistically significant at the 95% level in bold; 
* Netherlands (2007), Luxembourg (2008), Malta (2008); ** UK 2010 values for 2011;  
Source: Gallup World Poll 
 
Germany’s image is an assessment of the country’s relative standing vis-à-vis other major 
powers. Besides Germany, the Gallup World Poll also asks respondents to assess the job 
performance of the leadership of other major European players such as France and the UK.
4 
Table 2 summarises the approval rates for the year 2010 – the last wave for which comparable 
data are available for all three powers. 
Table 2. Approval for Germany, France and the UK (2010) 
Country Germany  France  UK 
Netherlands  70%  47% 49% 
Finland  66%  51% 51% 
Hungary  66%  50% 53% 
Denmark  63%  39% 41% 
Slovenia*  62%  39% 32% 
France  58%  36% 32% 
Luxembourg  57%  39% 31% 
Lithuania 57%  41%  52% 
Romania  55%  47% 43% 
Bulgaria  54%  45% 43% 
Austria  53%  29% 27% 
Spain 50%  46%  33% 
Czech Republic  50%  43%  49% 
Ireland 49%  43%  46% 
Slovakia  47%  40% 37% 
Latvia*  44%  32% 31% 
Germany 43%  40%  30% 
United Kingdom  43%  33%  45% 
Estonia* 42%  38%  34% 
Italy  38%  28% 26% 
Sweden  38%  23% 29% 
Poland 37%  37%  39% 
                                                      
4 Within Germany, France and the UK approval of the job performance for the own country’s leadership 
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Portugal  30%  23% 19% 
Belgium  28%  23% 19% 
Cyprus 26%  29%  21% 
Malta  23%  18% 17% 
Greece 23%  36%  21% 
Notes: Sorted by Germany’s approval; statistically significant 
difference at 95% level between first and second placed marked bold; 
* 2009 values  
Source: Gallup World Poll 
 
The data reveal a striking result. Germany’s leadership is viewed more positively than that of its 
rivals France and the UK by a statistically significant difference in 17 member states. In 
countries such as Hungary, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Finland, there are wide margins 
between Germany and the second most popular power. For instance, in the Netherlands, 
Germany has an approval rating of 70%, with the UK coming in second with 49%. France has a 
higher approval balance in Greece, by 36% to Germany’s 23%. By contrast, nowhere in Europe 
is the United Kingdom more popular than Germany by a statistically significant margin. Finally, 
there is no clear most popular power in nine member states. 
A quick glance beyond Europe reveals that Germany’s image compares well to that of other 
major powers, also at the global level. Figure 1 indicates that the popularity of German 
leadership was virtually identical to that of the United States in 2011 and has improved in recent 
years. In many countries around the world Germany is the most popular major power.
5 
Figure 1. Global approval rates of major powers 
 
 
There are several lessons that can be drawn from the World Poll data collected by Gallup. First, 
within the European Union, German leadership is rated at very high levels. With the significant 
                                                      
5 More information can be obtained from: (http://www.gallup.com/poll/153965/Germany-Tie-Highest-
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exception of Greece (and Cyprus), approval is higher than disapproval by large margins in 
virtually all EU states. 
Second, in comparing the current data with data collected before the onset of the crisis, it is 
evident that Germany’s image has improved in many member states, and particularly in the 
larger states. At present, Germany’s leadership appears to be valued both inside and outside the 
eurozone and in the north and south of the EU. It will be interesting to see if these trends 
continue in the future, particularly in the crisis-affected countries of the eurozone periphery. 
Third, comparing approval of Germany with that of France and the United Kingdom reveals 
that Germany is the most popular major power in a majority of countries.  
Fourth, Greece is proving to be a massive exception. Approval of Germany there has collapsed 
and a majority of Greeks now disapprove of the country’s leadership. German leaders can 
perhaps take heart in the fact that such swings can also happen in the other direction, as 
illustrated by the examples of Spain and Poland. 
Finally, it is worth taking note of the rise of Germany’s image outside Europe. The political and 
economic challenges of the financial crisis appear not to have dented approval of the country’s 
leadership.   
6 | 
It’s Germany Stupid! 
The Greek-German Misunderstanding 
George N. Tzogopoulos
* 
he Greek crisis, which broke out in October 2009, is multi-faceted, having played out in 
the economic, political, and social arenas. It has also had a significant impact on the 
country’s media and public debate. The idea of Greeks taking on a European identity has 
given way to emerging ethnocentric feelings and an increasing antipathy towards ‘foreigners.’ 
Representatives of the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Commission (EC), and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) – the so-called Troika – have been demonised in public 
debates. But it is Germany – the leading economic power in Europe – that has been marked out 
as the ‘other’; becoming synonymous with ‘evil’ and being made responsible for the Greek 
tragedy. 
Of all the national crises playing out within the eurozone, the Greek crisis is the only one to 
feature a degree of continuous hostility between two of its members at both the political and 
public levels. In Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, the crisis did not turn into a bilateral clash. 
German economic policy is certainly criticised in these other countries, but it has not taken the 
extreme form found in the Hellenic Republic. Why has the Greek case triggered a wave of 
hostility towards Berlin? The following analysis will seek to answer this question by 
considering Germany’s image in the Greek political, media, and public agendas. It will also 
attempt to suggest practical solutions that could contribute to an improvement in the 
relationship. 
Scapegoating as a persuasion technique 
Germany’s role in the response to the European debt crisis is easily understood. The recipe of 
austerity, drastic fiscal consolidation, and IMF involvement in rescue packages has largely 
represented its national strategy. Moreover, Berlin has made no secret of its frustration when 
weak and undisciplined countries like Greece have failed to live up to its own standards. For 
Germany’s part, it is perhaps convenient to attribute the crisis shaking the foundations of the 
common currency to the performance of a single state. The insistence on an expiatory victim 
could postpone other radical policy decisions such as of the introduction of Eurobonds or a 
Euro-wide banking resolution system that would lead to further integration and require the 
transfer of national powers to the Union. Naturally, a lively debate is in progress that associates 
Germany with the prolonging of the eurozone crisis in Greece. Of course, this reflects a 
misconception on the part of several politicians, journalists, and academics who consider the 
Memorandum of Understanding unsuccessful while often ignoring the fact that the Greek 
government has only partially implemented it.  
An adjustment-economic programme – like the one inspired by Germany and imposed by the 
European Union – cannot be fairly judged if it is not properly applied. Starting in May 2010, 
Greek authorities have mainly concentrated on salary and pension cuts as well as tax rises, but 
have shown almost no progress in carrying out structural reforms and privatisation. In addition 
to this, laws passed in the Parliament have not been enacted because the politicians lack the will 
                                                      
* Dr. George N. Tzogopoulos is Bodossaki post-doctoral fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European 
& Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and editor of its website. His second book, The Greek Drama in the 
Media: Stereotyping in the International Press, will be published by Ashgate in September 2012. His first 
book, US Foreign Policy in the European Media: Framing the Rise and Fall of Neoconservatism, will 
soon be published by I.B.TAURIS.  
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or are unable to win the battle against trade unions and privileged groups. As a consequence, the 
majority of Greek citizens are now paying a heavy price. They are victims of their government’s 
one-sided response to the crisis, which has finally led the country into a paralysing recession.  
This is in line with Greek politicians’ traditional modus operandi of putting personal and narrow 
political interests above national interests and of transferring responsibility for failures and 
omissions either to political opponents or to external factors. In other words, scapegoating has 
been the persuasion technique of choice for members of both the conservative and the socialist 
parties for years, helping them to achieve their own priorities at the expense of the Greek 
population and future generations. In a remarkable pre-crisis example, when Greece was hit 
with wildfires in August 2007, then Minister of Public Order, Viron Polidoras, attributed his 
government’s failure to save parts of the country to the “general wind.” At precisely that time, 
he argued, winds had changed direction, hindering the work of fire-fighters.  
Being well versed in finding scapegoats, it is not surprising that Greek politicians have adopted 
a similar persuasion strategy since October 2009. In a simplistic but straightforward way, they 
have not hesitated to condemn Germany for the slow death of the Hellenic economy. Within 
this framework, personifications have become an important feature, as Chancellor Angela 
Merkel and Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble are the figures that have garnered the most 
blame. Specifically, criticism is interwoven into three interconnected aspects. The first is 
Berlin’s alleged delay to act pre-emptively in support of Greece in the beginning of 2010 and 
immediately emphasise the need for a European bailout package. The second is Germany’s 
supposed intransigence in accepting a growth plan to help the bankrupt country escape 
recession. And the third is its presumed strategy of adopting an aggressive rhetoric vis-à-vis the 
Hellenic Republic in order to accrue immediate political benefits at home.  
There are a plethora of examples that highlight the stance of Greek politicians towards their 
German partners. A striking one is the phrase used by Greek President Karolos Papoulias on 15 
February 2012. Referring to the German finance minister, Papoulias said: “I don’t accept that 
my country is vilified by Mr. Schäuble. I don’t accept it as a Greek person. Who is Mr Schäuble 
to humiliate Greece?” In similar cases, the leader of the right-wing party LAOS, George 
Karatzaferis, focused on “German domination” while the leader of the left-wing SYRIZA, 
Alexis Tsipras, concentrated on the “economic chauvinism of Ms. Merkel.” In addition, former 
PASOK member and now independent MP George Dimaras sent an aggressive letter to the 
chairman of the Legal Committee of the German Parliament, Siegfried Kauder, on 30 January 
2012. He argued, inter alia, that “thanks to Greece, Germans have been transformed from cruel 
and uncivilised Goths into an orderly nation.” 
Various Greek politicians have also used emotion in their attempts to criticise Berlin. They have 
frequently invoked the issue of World War II reparations, arguing that Germany had failed to 
respond to its financial obligations. In an interview with the BBC on 25 February 2010, Vice 
President Theodoros Pangalos commented: “They [the Nazis] took away the Greek gold that 
was in the Bank of Greece, they took away Greek money and they never gave it back.” He 
concluded: “I don’t say they have to give back the money necessarily, but they have to say 
thanks. And they [the German government] shouldn’t complain much about stealing and not 
being very specific about economic dealings.” On that basis, the emotional message sent by 
Greek political elites is that the Hellenic Republic has been imprisoned in a labyrinth by a 
country with a catastrophic and unforgivable past.  
Portraying Germans  
Anti-German feelings in Greece have not been limited to statements and interviews by Greek 
politicians. They have also become a dominant element in the media discourse and public 
opinion. A number of journalists have expressed their ire for Berlin’s alleged aspirations to 
“occupy” the Hellenic Republic and build their own sphere of influence in the country.  Their 8 | GEORGE N. TZOGOPOULOS 
 
stance can be attributed to three different factors. The first is their refusal to analyse the Greek 
debt crisis in depth, often leading them to fall back on convenient and populist stories. The 
second is their general preference for strike-related and commercial themes that can easily 
attract the attention of their audience. And the third is their defensive instinct after Focus 
magazine published a picture on its front page portraying Aphrodite of Melos begging for 
money in February 2010. 
The Greek media have as a whole actively participated in the communication war between the 
Hellenic Republic and Germany. Only a few days after the Focus cover, the conservative daily 
Eleftheros Typos responded by printing an image of the Goddess Victoria holding a swastika. 
After the European Summit of 26-27 October 2011, the left-leaning Eleftherotypia asserted that 
German tanks would invade Greece. Symbolically, Greek-German misunderstanding had 
penetrated the media discourse to the degree that even sports newspapers covered a battle 
between the two states during a football game between Olympiacos FC and Borussia Dortmund 
in the group stage of the Champions League. On 18 October 2011, sport magazine Gavros 
urged Olympiacos FC players to “kick Germans in order to make Greece smile and humiliate 
the Fourth Economic Reich.” The main picture on its front page was that of Chancellor Merkel 
in a Nazi uniform.  
As far as Greek public opinion is concerned, it can hardly resist the anti-German rhetoric used 
by political elites and journalists. Ordinary citizens have been through much personal pain due 
to various rounds of austerity measures that were supposedly dictated by the German 
government. A survey conducted by the polling company VPRC in February 2012 clearly 
mirrors their anger. 79% of the respondents have a negative view towards Germany and 81% 
view Chancellor Merkel negatively. Furthermore, 32.4% link the country to Hitler, Nazism, and 
the Third Reich while 77% consider it a fair argument that Berlin is exerting a policy equivalent 
to the creation of a “Fourth Reich.” Perhaps as a logical consequence, some Greeks did not 
hesitate to burn German flags during demonstrations and parades.  
Facilitating a rapprochement  
The anti-German rhetoric prevailing in the Greek political, media, and public agendas is a 
critical aspect of the Hellenic and European debt crisis. This communication problem, however, 
has become even more important due to the parallel development of anti-Greek sentiments 
emerging in Germany. Berlin, for instance, has sometimes openly offended Athens, as it did in 
January 2012, with Germany’s alleged plan for a budget commissioner to take control of Greek 
fiscal policy. Furthermore, the German people are not fanatic supporters of the bailout packages 
and national media have often regarded the Greek people as bankrupt, corrupt, and lazy.  
It is clear that Germany and Greece lack the necessary solidarity to work together. They are also 
jeopardising their historical friendship through the current situation of deep misunderstanding 
and hostility. At first glance, it seems that the relationship between the countries is gradually 
reaching an impasse. As long as the Greek people are suffering poverty, unemployment, and 
psychological uncertainty, no dramatic change is expected. Important as it is, the 
communication dimension of the Hellenic crisis can only follow developments at the economic, 
political, and social levels.  
An efficient communication strategy can, however, certainly play a role in facilitating a 
rapprochement. Here, attention should turn towards Germany as the leading economic power in 
Europe. Being aware that it is represented as the ‘other’ in Greece, its government should 
employ a new method to remove the label. This might include frequent explanatory press 
conferences and the publication of readable press releases in both German and Greek that 
elaborate Berlin’s policies vis-à-vis the Hellenic crisis. On that basis, public opinion in Greece, 
which is currently ill informed, would have a chance to learn the truth by accessing a primary 
source. A reinforced communication strategy from Berlin need not be considered an IT’S GERMANY STUPID! THE GREEK-GERMAN MISUNDERSTANDING | 9 
 
interference in Greek politics. It could be presented, and pursued, as a sign of mutual respect 
and an attempt to clarify existing misunderstandings.  
The multi-faceted crisis hitting Greece could certainly be a springboard for pushing the country 
towards reform. The path for change is a rather painful process that requires difficult political 
decisions and sacrifices. Within this context, populism has been on the rise and interwoven into 
politics. On the one hand, Greek politicians, who have invested in a system of clientelism, over-
borrowing, and overspending for decades, often prefer to associate the necessity of fiscal 
consolidation with plans imposed from abroad – especially from Germany – in order to shift 
blame for the tragedy. On the other hand, German politicians, who frequently comment and 
insist on the supposed efficiency of their plan for the Hellenic Republic, push responsibility for 
non-implementation onto their Greek colleagues, despite the fact that the real margin for 
immediate success is rather limited.   
But mutual scapegoating tactics combined with continuous hostile disagreement on the reasons 
for the current stalemate cannot contribute to a better vision for the future. A policy based on 
realism is missing for the time being. There are two main elements to such a policy that would 
constitute sine qua non parameters. The first is the belief that it is in Greece’s national interest 
to modernise its economy, restructure its public administration, and reform itself even if 
Germany does not exert pressure from outside. And the second is the conviction that much more 
time and patience are required for the Hellenic Republic to achieve the goals of the 
Memorandum of Understanding. Whether both sides will practically endorse the principles of 
responsibility will become clear in the following critical months. 
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Italy’s Perception of Germany and German 
Europeanism, 1992-2012 
Federico Niglia
* 
Past and prejudice in the Italian representation of Germany 
The idea of Germany and Italy sharing a common history and destiny has interested intellectuals 
and commentators since the late 19th century. The two “verspätete Nationen” (late-coming 
nations) were thought to have a similar future, despite huge cultural, political, and economic 
differences.  
The scourge of two world wars and the tragedy of 1943-45 did not entirely undo this belief: 
even today, Germany and Italy are portrayed, at least in the Italian narrative, as two countries 
with ‘something in common.’ Their common destiny is also one of the main features of 
Europeanist rhetoric: Germany and Italy are two countries that overcame past dictatorships and 
built new democracies in the European framework. The newly found convergence between the 
two countries was symbolised by the two post-war leaders: Alcide De Gasperi and Konrad 
Adenauer.
1  
In turning attention to the emotions at play within German-Italian relations, however, a slightly 
more complex picture emerges. The image of Germany and Germans has always been a mix of 
public and private narratives, including prejudices and old stereotypes. During the Cold War, 
when Italy and the FRG were officially aligned in defence of the West, the Italian view of 
Germany was a complex mix of the positive and negative. In the public discourse, Germany 
was always presented as one of Italy’s closest political and economic partners that shared the 
same vision on international and European affairs. On the other hand, despite its division, 
Germany was perceived as a country that was ‘too big’ to abstain from monopolising power in 
the EEC.
2 When Adenauer established a political axis with Charles De Gaulle’s France, the fear 
of a coalition between the two biggest Western European countries became an idée fixe for 
many Italians. This ambivalence remains today. 
Suspicion of Germany’s leadership aspirations is deeply rooted in the Italian imagination, and is 
not exclusive to average citizens; it is also shared by the political and diplomatic élite. Research 
confirms that Italian diplomacy has often attempted to contain the rise of Germany and has 
triggered suspicion among the governments of smaller European countries. Giulio Andreotti, 
the leading political figure in Italy until the late 1980s, used to quote François Muriac in 
affirming that “We love Germany so much that we would prefer to have two of them.” In 
1989/90, the Italian government (unsuccessfully) attempted to slow down the process of 
German reunification, thereby confirming the endurance of old prejudices. 
After reunification, however, official relations between Rome and Berlin quickly returned to 
normal and were as good as those between Rome and Bonn. But since then, Italy has had to face 
a new continental power, free from the constraints that hindered its capacity to play an active 
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1 See the latest book edited by M. Cau, L'Europa di De Gasperi e Adenauer. La sfida della ricostruzione 
[Europe of De Gasperi and Adenauer.The Challenge of Re-building] (1945-1951), Bologna: Il Mulino, 
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role in Europe and in the world for 40 years. The Italian intelligentsia found it very hard to 
adapt when it was confronted with a changing Europe. An article written by the renowned 
journalist Furio Colombo in September 1990 illustrates the point:  
I fear that the disparity in weight between Germany and Europe will become more 
marked, because while Germany gets heavier, physically, its partners become less 
responsible, psychologically, less attentive, less determined to play a role as main 
actors. [...] For us, therefore, the problem of Germany is linked to the problem of Italy.
3 
(free translation from Italian). 
The inability to appreciate the positive role that a reunified Germany could play in Europe has 
led many Italians to reiterate old slogans against German hegemonic aspirations. These 
perceptions played an important role during the 1990s, when a new phase of European 
integration began with the Maastricht Treaty.  
Maastricht and the myth of a ‘Germanised’ Europe 
From the Italian point of view, Maastricht was a typical ‘German’ product because it was 
strongly influenced by the German economic tradition and vision, with an emphasis on stability 
and the fight against inflation; monetary union was thus perceived as an extension of German 
monetary rules to the rest of Europe.  
When the treaty was signed and ratified, Italy was experiencing a period of dramatic 
institutional and economic transition and faced huge problems adapting to the standards 
required by the treaty. The Maastricht Treaty, poorly explained to the European people, was 
perceived by many Italians as an additional burden on their reform process that was mainly 
imposed by Germany. In these years, much of national public opinion saw Germany as a big 
and prosperous country acting without concern for the problems affecting other European 
partners. Only a few observers noticed that Germany was also experiencing a huge transition 
and was restructuring its institutional and economic system in order to reduce the gap between 
the Eastern and Western Länder.  
During these years, most of the support for Germany came from a small but authoritative elite; 
the same group that safeguarded the transition from the so-called ‘first’ to the ‘second’ Italian 
Republic. The connection with Germany and the European project was mainly defended by a 
technocratic elite from public economic institutions (Bank of Italy, Ministry of the Treasury, 
etc.). Strong support also came from the two prime ministers who ruled from 1992 to 1994, 
Giuliano Amato and Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, who were both positively orientated towards 
Germany. Ciampi, as former Governor of the Bank of Italy, had a deep knowledge of Germany 
and its economy, and established a proactive dialogue ‘at eye level’ with Berlin. Silvio 
Berlusconi, whose first government lasted less than two years (1994-95), did not change this 
orientation. The two centre-left governments that followed (Romano Prodi and Massimo 
D’Alema) confirmed the country’s good relations with Germany. These centre-left governments 
pushed for respect of the Maastricht parameters and adopted tough measures for the 
achievement of this goal.
4 
The economy was the Italians’ main concern throughout the 1990s, and the fact that the 
“German inspired” European Union was asking for sacrifices from Italian consumers and 
taxpayers helped strengthen the shadow over Germany’s image. Between 1991 and 2001, the 
                                                      
3 «Ho paura che la sproporzione di peso fra Germania ed Europa si farà più marcata, perchè mentre la 
Germania si appesantisce, fisicamente, i suoi partner diventano meno responsabili, psicologicamente, 
meno attenti, meno decisi a giocare un ruolo, meno protagonisti. […] Per noi, dunque, il problema della 
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Italian and German economies performed in very different ways. In the early 1990s, both 
countries suffered from large domestic imbalances: Germany was still an economically divided 
country with the heavy burden of integrating the new Länder, while Italy had to completely 
reform its system of public finance. Ten years later, however, the picture was different: 
Germany had been able to ‘reconnect’ the East with the West and emerged as a global economic 
player. Italy, by contrast, did not complete the recovery process and appeared to be unfit for 
competition at the global level: large industrial structures were dismantled and SMEs were 
unable to enter the new markets. Italy appeared to be one of the victims of German dynamism: 
German enterprises and banks were replacing the Italian presence in many Balkan and Eastern 
European countries, and were also taking advantage of political initiatives from national 
governments in specific countries.
5   
It should be underlined, however, that Germany was seen not only as a threat, but also as a good 
model that Italy could follow to modernise itself. In 1996 one of the most respected Italian 
journalists, Federico Rampini, published the book Germanizzazione, in which he enumerated 
the main factors that had transformed Germany into what he believed was a model for Europe: 
the German criteria for public finance that were transformed into EU rules, and the German 
model of capitalism.
6 For a minority of Italian experts and researchers, the German model was 
the best way to reform the Italian institutional and economic system. The question that 
challenged the majority then was whether Italy should follow the same road. 
In the decade following reunification, Germany developed a dual role for Italy: on the one hand 
it emerged as the new leader in Europe and as the new aggressive economic superpower, while 
also providing a model for countries that wished to reform their institutions and their economy.  
From Baghdad to Merkozy: the troubled years 2001-11 
It is important to stress that in the decade between 1991 and 2001, Italian concerns about 
German initiatives at the European level were compensated to an extent by a convergence in the 
transatlantic context: Germany and Italy, both loyal members of NATO, were also ‘good 
friends’ of the United States. 
But this assumption could no longer be taken for granted at the beginning of the new 
millennium, when the US administration elaborated its own response to the threat of 
international terrorism. Initially, both the German and the Italian governments gave their full 
support to the intervention in Afghanistan. But when George W. Bush promoted a larger 
initiative to stabilise what he called the “broader Middle East,” Palazzo Chigi and the 
Bundeskanzleramt reacted very differently to the decision to intervene in Iraq. Berlusconi fully 
supported the US approach and joined the heterogeneous coalition of European countries 
supporting the intervention against Saddam Hussein.
7 The German government, which was 
fundamentally in line with the general purpose of fighting terrorism, did not follow. In 
opposition to the support provided by a number of EU countries (the United Kingdom, Spain, 
Italy, Holland, Portugal, Denmark, and Italy), the German government joined France in 
opposing the military intervention.  
Cooperation between Italy and Germany at the EU level was deeply affected by their different 
political orientations and diverging attitudes on a major foreign policy issue. Berlusconi 
inverted the priorities of Italian foreign policy and subordinated Italy’s traditional European 
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orientation to bilateral partnerships outside of the EU (with the US as well as with Vladimir 
Putin’s Russia).
8 In his reassessment of Italian foreign policy, he revived the nightmare of the 
Franco-German axis and openly criticised the emergence of a ‘Germanised Europe’ in which 
key decisions were taken by Berlin and Paris.  
These years also saw occasional drama: the Berlusconi-Schulz clash in the European Parliament 
was only the most notorious example of a broader problem. The situation partially improved 
when Romano Prodi came back to Palazzo Chigi: the centre-left cabinet formally restored the 
EU as the first reference point for Italy, and pushed for a new era of good relations with 
Germany.
9 
However, the financial and economic crisis that broke out in 2008 jeopardised the newly found 
convergence between the two countries. Since 2008, when the US financial crisis spread all 
over the world and hit the EU hard, Germany and Italy spoke with two different voices. Angela 
Merkel has pushed strongly to safeguard stable and credible European economies through strict 
fiscal rules and the fight against inflation. The Berlusconi government, alongside other EU 
governments, promoted a different approach to the crisis.
10 From 2010 to 2011, when the effects 
of the global recession became evident in the EU, the two visions openly clashed. German and 
ECB officials expressed dismay at the Italian proposals and Merkel openly criticised 
Berlusconi’s and Giulio Tremonti’s initiatives. Despite what he called a “friendship” with the 
French President Sarkozy, Berlusconi did not succeed in stopping the revival of the Paris-Berlin 
axis. In addition, the difficult personal relationship between the German chancellor and the 
Italian prime minister made clear the estrangement between the two leaderships.  
It should be noted that many Italians did not appreciate what they perceived as a German sense 
of superiority: when, in a public conference in October 2011, Merkel and Sarkozy smirked 
when quizzed about Berlusconi’s capacity to address the crisis, Italians unanimously criticised 
their impolite and ungenerous behaviour.
11 Even though many Italian observers struggled with 
the lack of credibility affecting Italy at international level due to Berlusconi’s stance in foreign 
affairs, the fact that Germany was so rigid and orthodox at the EU level increased Italian 
disappointment with Germany’s leadership.  
But this was not just about Berlusconi. Not surprisingly, even after Berlusconi resigned and 
Mario Monti became prime minister, the criticism of Germany did not diminish. When the 
Greek crisis worsened throughout 2011, the German government maintained its firm stance, 
refusing to give unconditional support to countries in crisis or under the attack of speculation. 
Most Italian commentators criticised Merkel’s approach: for the first time, the chancellor was 
presented as the defender of German interests as opposed to European ones. The recent defeat 
of Merkel’s CDU in elections in the largest federal state, North-Rhine Westphalia, has been 
welcomed with outright satisfaction: Ernesto Galli della Loggia, a well-known historian and 
commentator, condemned the “empty austerity of a German Europe.”
12  While centre-right 
commentators could now take revenge on the chancellor who belittled Italy, even moderate and 
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leftist voices clamoured for the end of old-line austerity in the EU. In both cases, Merkel’s 
Germany is portrayed as an out-dated model for European growth.  
A concern for Italian analysts: the rise of Germany at the global level  
For the average Italian, Germany is closely connected with the economic problems currently 
affecting the EU. But for experts of foreign policy and international relations, another factor 
affects perceptions about Germany: the rise of Germany as a global political power.  
Freed from the burdens of the Cold War and the division of the country, Berlin started to play a 
new role at international level after reunification. Germany was rapidly affirmed as one of the 
world leading economic powers, with a strong orientation towards export and specialisation in 
strategic sectors such as green energy, automobiles, etc. Germany entered a virtuous circle in 
which a high-performing economy supported social and political growth, while Italy was stuck 
in a vicious circle of poor economic performance hindering the recovery of public finance 
indicators and the alleviation of structural problems (above all the gap between north and south 
and the structural weaknesses of an economic system based on SMEs).   
The country’s primary role in international economic relations, alongside a renewed faith in the 
German nation, led political, economic and intellectual elites to ask for international recognition 
of the change of the ‘new’ Germany. The UN became an important arena for this German 
affirmation: since the early 2000s, German diplomats have openly campaigned for a permanent 
seat on the UN Security Council. Italians perceive the German struggle for recognition as a 
direct threat, since they believe that a German ‘rise’ would be compensated by a ‘downgrading’ 
of Italy. The Italian delegation at the UN has sought to contain the German proposal and Italy 
still promotes UN reforms that oppose German proposals.
13  
In the last few years, Italian diplomacy has increasingly suffered from the German tendency to 
take centre stage, as in 2006, when Rome was excluded from the 5+1 group (the 5 permanent 
members of the UNSC plus Germany) in charge of negotiations with Iran, even though Italy 
was Teheran’s most important trading partner.  
Fundamentally, Italy has not accepted the new confidence that Germans have in the capacity of 
their country to play a role at international level. Recently, only a few commentators have been 
optimistic about the emergence of a ‘global Germany.’ The major reason being that it is not 
possible for most analysts to separate positive judgements of Germany from negative 
perceptions of Italy.  
Let’s move on! Understanding the German-Italian partnership 
The new Italian government headed by Mario Monti has worked to establish a new dialogue 
with the German leadership.
14 After Nicolas Sarkozy’s electoral defeat in France, many 
commentators have called for a new Merkel-Monti partnership (a politically correct version of 
the old Rome-Berlin axis). Going beyond slogans, and despite the uncertainty in predicting the 
evolution of European politics, there might indeed be a rapprochement between Germany and 
Italy in the dialogue on European recovery.  
But in the popular narrative, Italians perceive Germany as a source of concern rather than as a 
partner. A logical consequence of this perception is the deterioration of actual German-Italian 
relations. Strong evidence confirms what renowned historian Gian Enrico Rusconi has called 
the “schleichende Entfremdung” (creeping alienation) now affecting relations between the two 
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countries.
15 Minor problems are overblown in the public narrative, while the existing strong 
arguments in favour of a German-Italian partnership are rarely mentioned. 
The economy, which has always been presented as the main source of division between Italy 
and Germany, should actually be seen as a key argument in favour of the partnership. Looking 
at bilateral economic relations, Germany is an important and stable partner for Italy: in 2011, 
Italian exports to Germany grew by 12.5%, confirming Germany as the main buyer of Italian 
goods.
16 It should be noted too that Italy is also a key market for Germany: between 1998 and 
2009, Germany’s export surplus has grown by 543%;
17 the cases of Deutsche Bank, for which 
Italy is the second market after Germany, and Audi, which bought the Italian motorcycle maker 
Ducati, confirm Italy’s importance for German investors. Recent surveys have also reaffirmed 
that bilateral cooperation has huge potential in each sector included in the High-Tech Strategy 
2020, most notably in the field of renewable energies. 
There are good reasons for Italy and Germany to revitalise their relations during this time of 
crisis. The task is apparently very simple: both Germans and Italians need to recognise the 
existing strong relations and present their partnership in a more realistic way. But stereotypes 
and misperceptions are not easily manageable. Given that, the European response to the 
economic and political crisis cannot be pursued without an effective and reciprocal 
understanding of European people, especially those of the countries that are founding members 
of the EEC. 
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The View from Spain: 
Between euro-enthusiasm and euro-austerity 
Laia Mestres
* 
pain has traditionally been a country of Euro-enthusiasts. Spaniards have supported 
membership in the European Union because they believe that it contributes to the 
economic and social modernisation of Spain, as well as to its international reputation. 
Since 1986, Spanish Europeanism has reflected the widespread conviction that the country was 
finally gaining its rightful place in Europe. As the philosopher José Ortega y Gasset wrote more 
than a century ago, “Spain is the problem, Europe is the solution.”  
Spanish politicians have repeatedly pointed out that there has been one solution for every 
problem in Spain: ‘more Europe.’ But what does ‘more Europe’ mean for Spaniards today? The 
economic crisis has not only had a negative impact on Spain’s image abroad, it also has 
significantly reduced its room for political manoeuvre in the EU. Indeed, Spain has gone from 
being a subject to an object of European policy. And this is having an effect on Spanish 
citizens’ perceptions, who share the impression that the austerity agenda is being imposed by 
the European Union. Since austerity is increasingly seen as unfair and has had a damaging 
effect on the economy, the blame has shifted to the EU and in particular to Germany. 
The aim of this article is to explain both how and when German influence has shaped Spanish 
policy vis-à-vis the EU, as well as how Spanish public opinion and media are changing their 
positive opinion of Germany as the economic crisis worsens.   
The complexity of an asymmetrical relationship  
Can Spain become the Germany of the South? Whatever one might think about this question, 
this was Mariano Rajoy’s goal when he was elected in November 2011. After eight years of 
socialist government and with unemployment rates at more than 24%, Rajoy’s plan to solve the 
economic crisis is the same as Merkel’s: austerity measures, budget cuts, and structural reforms. 
The adoption of Germany as a model is not new in Spanish European policy. During its 
transition to democracy in the late 1970s, Germany’s federal structure and its collective 
bargaining system (in terms of relations between the government, employer federations, and 
labour unions) provided inspiration for tackling some of the most politically-charged issues of 
that time. Furthermore, following the model of the Franco-German summits, Spain developed a 
strategy to place itself at the very heart of European politics in the early 1980s that consisted of 
nurturing closer ties to the larger EU member states, most notably Germany, France, and Italy 
(and, on occasion, the United Kingdom). This strategy saw the institutionalisation of regular 
bilateral summits at the highest level along the lines of the Franco-German summits. The first 
official summit between Helmut Kohl and Felipe González took place in Madrid in 1984, and 
was viewed as a sign of German support for Spanish membership of the European Community; 
it was also particularly crucial in light of France’s rather vocal opposition to membership. The 
close relationship between the two leaders became even more influential after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. González offered his unconditional support both to German reunification and to the 
move towards political union in Europe. In exchange, Kohl agreed to a significant increase in 
EU structural and cohesion funds, as well as to the inclusion of European citizenship in the 
Maastricht Treaty; two issues that had been put forward by Spain.   
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Despite the fact that Spanish-German summits were held annually, the relationship between 
Gerhard Schröder and José María Aznar in the mid-1990s became fraught with difficulties. The 
battle for European financial resources became evident when Spain succeeded in maintaining a 
considerable amount of the 2000-2006 structural and cohesion funds. The rivalry reached its 
peak when Aznar led the group of European countries that supported the US-led attack on Iraq, 
in opposition to the French and German position.   
Since Angela Merkel’s election as chancellor in November 2005, and in the wake of several 
inopportune declarations and diverging views on business matters (mainly the dispute regarding 
the takeover bid for Endesa between the German power firm E.ON and the Spanish company 
Gas Natural), relations between Spain and Germany have somewhat cooled, while relations 
between Spain and France experienced a kind of honeymoon. Even though José Luis Rodríguez 
Zapatero tried to join the Franco-German axis through a strategy known as the return to the 
heart of Europe, Spain started to feel that it was returning to the periphery of Europe. The spiral 
of disagreements between Spain and Germany was only aggravated by the harsh effects of the 
economic and financial crisis in Europe, which has strongly impacted Spain. One of the most 
notorious episodes was caused by an E. coli outbreak in Germany in June 2011. Without 
reliable data, German officials blamed cucumbers imported from Spain as the source of the 
disease, and the European Commission immediately (and prematurely) issued a health warning 
throughout Europe concerning Spanish fruit and vegetables. Despite the fact that every 
scientific analysis carried out in Spain and Germany on cucumber samples proved negative, 
Spanish agriculture was severely damaged both in economic and reputational terms.  
The German discourse on Spain and its economic reforms varies depending on which analyst 
you ask. If the discourse is addressed to German voters, old stereotypes about lazy southern 
Europeans prevail. For instance, speaking at a rally in May 2011, Angela Merkel suggested that 
people in Greece, Portugal, and Spain took too many holidays and retired too early while 
Germans were expected to bail them out.
1  
But the German government has always proved receptive during bilateral meetings. At the last 
German-Spanish summit between Angela Merkel and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, the 
Chancellor admitted: “Spain has really done its homework and I think it is on the right track.”
2 
And Volker Kauder, Head of the CDU parliamentary group in the Bundestag, gave his support 
to Mariano Rajoy’s new government after the latter’s first 100 days in office: “The reforms 
adopted by Spain to tackle the deficit are heading in the right direction and will be successful,”
3 
he stated after examining in detail Spain’s budget for 2012, which had just been approved in 
order to meet the deficit objective of 5.3% of GDP imposed by Brussels.   
Spain’s new conservative government has become one of the staunchest advocates of the 
principle of euro-austerity. Even though many think that French proposals on supply-led growth 
could fit in well with Spain’s troubled economy, Mariano Rajoy has avoided taking part in the 
debate or even supporting this change in EU economic priorities, mostly in order to avoid 
destabilising stock and sovereign debt markets.  
One of the reasons that the Spanish-German bilateral relationship is asymmetrical is the lack of 
a common cooperation agenda both at the bilateral and European levels. The current crisis has 
made this asymmetry even more apparent. Spain cannot be seen as an ally or an equal partner of 
Germany because its politics and economy mainly depend on German leadership in the EU. 
                                                      
1  “Merkel under fire for ‘lazy Greeks’ comment”, EUObserver.com, 19 May 2011; “Merkel quiere que 
se armonicen vacaciones y jubilación en la UE”, El País, 18 May 2011. 
2 “Press Conference by the President of the Spanish Government, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, and the 
German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, following the 23rd Spanish-German Summit”, Madrid, 3 February 
2011 (http://lamoncloa.gob.es).  
3 “El partido de Merkel avala las reformas y se lleva una excelente impresión”, El Mundo, 2 April 2012.  18 | LAIA MESTRES 
 
The impact of euro-austerity on Spanish euro-enthusiasm  
“Spain, capital Berlin.”
4 This was the headline of a leading Barcelona newspaper the day that 
Angela Merkel visited Madrid in 2011. Rather than expressing anti-German feeling, it captured 
what most Spanish citizens feel is German omnipresence in their daily lives. As we have seen, 
German leaders have become all-pervasive in Spanish political debates. The same can be said of 
media and social debates.  
Angela Merkel has certainly become the most visible face of austerity measures imposed by the 
European Union. This is why her image, together with other Spanish politicians, was featured 
on several banners carried by the Indignados, or the 15-M Movement. At about the same time, a 
public opinion poll conducted by the Madrid-based think tank Real Instituto Elcano showed that 
Merkel’s popularity had fallen among Spaniards, though she did come in second place just after 
Barack Obama.
5 Furthermore, any public statement made by the German government on Spain 
is avidly echoed in the Spanish media. For instance, rumours published by Der Spiegel about a 
possible offer to facilitate the hiring of skilled Spaniards to work in Germany has resulted in an 
explosion of interest in learning German by young people.
6  
As with other Mediterranean countries, Spaniards are fearful of a two-speed Europe, since this 
would probably imply that Spain would no longer be included in the central core of the process 
of European integration. Although this has not happened yet, the citizens of these countries 
already believe that they are considered as second-class citizens in Europe. The debate on the 
possibility of a Greek exit from the eurozone and its aftermath has also opened a wider debate in 
southern Europe, including in Spain, on the benefits of the common currency. The above-
mentioned survey by the Real Instituto Elcano and other polls show that the majority of Spanish 
citizens believe that Spain has not benefited from the introduction of the euro, mainly due to the 
rise of basic product prices and, more recently, to the impossibility to devaluate the currency in 
order to increase competitiveness for its exports.
7 This perception contrasts with the consensus 
among experts that belonging to the eurozone has allowed Spain to benefit from better access to 
credit at a relatively low interest rate and has also contained inflation, which used to be above 
the EU average. All in all, experts and public opinion still believe that despite the shortcomings 
of the European Monetary Union, being ousted from the eurozone would be the worst case 
scenario. 
In addition, the potential failure of the euro is increasingly perceived as a real threat to the 
European Union. If Spain’s entry into the euro was perceived as a symbol of Spain’s deep 
commitment to the European project, the common currency may now become a scapegoat for 
social discontent. 
The aim of reducing the public deficit and debt through austerity measures is having an 
enormous impact on the lives of Spaniards. Cuts in health care, education, and research, ever-
growing rates of unemployment, and Spain’s return to being a country of emigration instead of 
immigration, together with the failure to effectively reduce public debt and calm the markets 
due to worsened growth prospects, are only some of the reasons for the almost daily 
demonstrations in every major city, and a general disenchantment with (national and European) 
politics.  
                                                      
4 Juliana, Enric, “España, capital Berlín”, La Vanguardia, 3 February 2011.  
5 27th Wave of the Barometer of the Real Instituto Elcano (BRIE), May-June 2011, p. 17. 
6 “Junge Europäer sollen zum Arbeiten nach Deutschland kommen”, Der Spiegel, 22 January 2011; 
quoted in, among others newspapers, “Merkel ofrece trabajo a Zapatero”, La Razón, 22 January 2011. 
7 28th Wave of the Barometer of the Real Instituto Elcano (BRIE), November-December 2011, p. 35; 
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José Ignacio Torreblanca, a leading columnist on EU affairs, has written several articles in the 
most-read newspaper in Spain, El País, as well as in The Financial Times, arguing that “it is 
time to say ‘basta’ to the nonsense of austerity.”
8 On a similar note, Pedro J. Ramírez, Editor-in-
chief of the centre-right newspaper El Mundo, reacted to the informal European summit on 
growth with this very critical tweet: “I did not like Merkel’s inflexible egoism at the summit. It 
is intolerable that Spain gets financing at a 6% interest rate, while Germany gets it at 1%.”  
The Spanish media are not the only ones denouncing the harshness of the austerity measures 
imposed on Spain. The international press is also starting to support the idea that fiscal 
consolidation should take place in a less abrupt manner. Recently, the New York Times 
published an editorial in which it recognised that  
Spain could be the next European economy brought down by Germany-led 
mismanagement of the eurozone crisis. It need not turn that way. But it surely will 
unless Chancellor Angela Merkel and her political allies inside and outside Germany 
acknowledge that no country can pay off its debts by suffocating economic growth.
9  
Europe Yes, but which Europe? 
Spaniards continue to define themselves as ‘Europeanists’. According to regular Eurobarometer 
polls, six out of ten Spaniards continue to believe that, on balance, their country has benefited 
from being a member of the European Union.
10 However, the first signs of euroscepticism can 
easily emerge in Spain if austerity plans imposed from abroad continue to inflict so much pain 
on Spanish citizens. The same polls show that trust in the European Union fell dramatically over 
the last year, with the same number of Spanish people declaring that they do not trust the 
European Union; a proportion that is well above the EU-27 average.  
While citizens feel further alienated from decision-making in the EU, Spanish political leaders 
have shied away from their classic mantra of ‘more Europe.’ Today, Spain is more an issue of 
the common agenda rather than an actor shaping European policies. The example of Eurobonds 
is illustrative. It is widely accepted that such a measure would be positive for Spain’s economy, 
but neither the previous socialist government nor the current conservative government have 
dared to defend this proposal before the rest of the EU member states. Spain has consciously 
decided not to lead any proposal that could destabilise financial markets or upset credit-rating 
agencies, the European Central Bank, or other EU member states.   
Spaniards are seeing a return of the old inferiority complex with regards to Germany or, in 
general, northern Europe. Since 1986, Spanish European policy has had the goal of placing 
Spain in Europe after more than forty years of dictatorship and international isolation. However, 
one of the effects of the financial crisis has been Spain’s return to the (geographical, political, 
and economic) periphery of Europe.  
 
                                                      
8 Torreblanca, José Ignacio, “Time to say basta to the nonsense of austerity”, The Financial Times, 25 
April 2012. 
9 “An Overdose of Pain, The New York Times, 12 April 2012.  
10 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer, No. 75, Spring 2011 and No. 76, autumn 2011.  
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Portugal through the EMU Crisis: 
Setting a good example for Germany 
João Gil Freitas and Sandra Fernandes
* 
Introduction 
This paper analyses Portuguese reactions to Germany’s lead role in combating the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) crises under the governments of José Sócrates (2005-2011) and Passos 
Coelho. The events leading to Portugal’s request for foreign aid in April 2011 – and to the 
subsequent external bailout – marked a turning point for the country. This event triggered new 
elections and led the country to closely align with the German model for dealing with the crisis. 
Until that point, the socialist government had managed to postpone German demands for 
austerity, although with limited macroeconomic success in improving the public debt. The 
current centre-right government assumed a policy much more in line with the conservative 
government of Angela Merkel. The emergence of Berlin as the centre of European affairs –
overshadowing the power of Brussels – triggered widespread discontent among its European 
partners and the European public. As far as Portugal is concerned, the country has pursued the 
role of ‘bon élève’ throughout the crisis, setting a counter-example to the Greek drama and 
embracing austerity. Nevertheless, growing sacrifices are leading to serious doubts about the 
efficiency of the ‘austerity method’ for the opposition and civil society. Section one addresses 
how Sócrates dealt positively with Berlin while failing to maintain internal cohesion and 
establish effective solutions. Section two illustrates how the current government has assumed 
the austerity strategy amidst growing internal suspicion about the best way to cope with the 
crisis. Finally, section three explains how the Greek stigma has played a role in Portuguese 
perceptions of the policies designed to cope with the crisis. 
Portugal under Sócrates: putting off German demands for austerity 
The German government was widely criticised for its rigidity towards eurozone countries that it 
considered ineffective at managing their public finances. Regarding Portugal however, 
Germany generally supported and incentivised José Sócrates’s efforts to control Portuguese 
public finances. Chancellor Merkel praised the work of his government and supported it until 
the very end (Sócrates resigned in March 2011 and handed over power in June), while accepting 
most of Portugal’s requests, including a compromise to reduce the deficit to 4.6% of GDP in 
March 2011. This compromise was reached only a few weeks before the country’s request for 
foreign aid (Portugal ended 2011 with a deficit of 5.8% of GDP despite enacting extraordinary 
measures).  
This relatively supportive approach reflected the Portuguese government’s own weakness. The 
Sócrates government – the socialist prime minister was re-elected for a second term in office 
without an absolute majority in the Parliament – was not always cohesive in its response to 
German proposals. In fact, several issues triggered divisions within the government even before 
the request for foreign aid. One of these issues was the German proposal to stipulate a deficit 
limit in the constitution for eurozone members. This proposal received the support of Luís 
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Amado, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but not the Prime Minister. The idea of reducing the 
retirement age and annual vacation days was another controversial issue in Portugal that was 
firmly rejected by Prime Minister Sócrates.  
The bilateral meeting between Sócrates and Angela Merkel in February 2011 highlighted the 
different approaches of each government: Portugal proposed raising up to 500 million euros for 
the European Financial Stabilisation Fund (EFSF), the possibility to intervene in the primary 
debt market, and asked for direct loans to member states (Lusa, 2011). Germany found it 
difficult to accept these measures due to intense domestic pressure at the time to create a plan of 
controlled bankruptcy for over-indebted countries. Merkel also remained sceptical about the 
more flexible EFSF desired by Sócrates (Ferreira, 2012). 
In parallel, the Sócrates government adopted a strategy of postponing requests for foreign aid 
for as long as possible. There was a widespread belief in Portugal that a formal request for 
foreign aid would be highly damaging to the country’s credibility thereafter. This belief was 
based on previous experiences with IMF interventions in 1978 and 1983 that were still fresh in 
the country’s collective memory. The Sócrates government agreed early on for the need to 
implement measures to cut back the country’s public expenditures. External pressure, 
particularly from Germany and France, was enough to prompt the Portuguese government to 
urge Parliament to adopt several Stability and Growth Pacts (PECs) that received praise from 
the German Chancellor. However, the line of action the government followed did not always 
coincide with the position of the Social Democrats (PSD) and the Christian Democrats (CDS), 
led by Paulo Portas, who went on to become Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government that 
replaced Sócrates. 
Parliament’s rejection of the fourth package of reforms (PEC IV) in late March 2011 forced the 
prime minister’s resignation, and new parliamentary elections were scheduled for early June 
2011. PEC IV included a stringent set of mandatory measures which the European Central 
Bank, the Commission, and countries like Germany demanded from Sócrates in order to avoid 
an external rescue involving the IMF. Merkel did not believe in the Portuguese government’s 
commitment to carry out these measures, but it nevertheless publicly praised the government, as 
well as the personal “courage” of Sócrates (Ferreira, 2012). 
The issue of Eurobonds long dominated the European agenda. The Portuguese prime minister 
strongly supported this idea despite German opposition. The German position caused some 
resentment in Portugal because it was seen as a case of the strong imposing decisions upon the 
weak. Chancellor Merkel was frequently accused of excessive firmness by several Portuguese 
political commentators; an image that gradually influenced civil society in general.  
Portugal under Passos Coelho: austerity but weakening internal support 
The Portuguese view on Eurobonds radically changed with the new government of Passos 
Coelho, who rejected the idea and thereby aligned himself with Germany. Vítor Gaspar, Passos 
Coelho’s finance minister, also believes that the previous government made a mistake by 
disregarding financial adjustment, which led Portugal to assume a deficit greater than its GDP 
and to incur more public debt. For Gaspar, this situation hugely undermined faith in the 
sustainability of public finances, which ultimately led to the need to request external assistance. 
Gaspar also praised the troika memorandum that advocated implementing a policy of financial 
adjustment in Portugal. He thinks that the memorandum lays out a balanced and credible 
strategy (Gaspar, 2012). 
As for Portugal’s own European policy, the government of Passos Coelho has aligned itself 
with Germany on the necessity of adopting austerity measures across Europe. Besides Passos 
Coelho himself, Vítor Gaspar is the most important voice within the government and the official 
who most actively communicates with the Portuguese people in order to explain the 
inevitability of the current sacrifices. Gaspar insists on the need to prioritise financial 22 | JOÃO GIL FREITAS & SANDRA FERNANDES 
 
adjustment as a basic condition for sustainable economic growth and the competitiveness of the 
country’s economy. Without an adjustment, Portugal cannot eliminate its budget deficit, let 
alone its external imbalance. 
Yet the Coelho government, notwithstanding its close alignment with Germany, never really 
managed to spread consensus within society about its macroeconomic options. The strategic 
option of strict adherence to the troika memorandum – and perhaps even going beyond its 
prescriptions – was criticised by Portuguese President Cavaco Silva. President Silva eagerly 
drew attention to an alleged excess of austerity, to the urgent need to reinforce EU economic 
governance, and to the need to outline a strategy focused on employment and economic 
development (Silva, 2011).  
German European policy, which was welcomed by the new centre-right Portuguese 
government, was now criticised by the political left. In different tones and for different reasons, 
the socialists, the communists, and the Left Block accused Merkel of unilaterally imposing her 
will on other countries. Additionally, they accused Berlin of insisting on policies that would 
ultimately destroy democracy in Europe and that would aggravate the crisis and lead to higher 
unemployment rates (Pureza, 2012). The socialists think that the current EMU is dysfunctional 
(and therefore, largely responsible for the crisis), and accuse the European right – of which the 
German chancellor is one of the most prominent figures – of subjugating the price and 
flexibility of labour to competitiveness goals that are to be achieved at any cost. 
Moreover, despite broad agreement between the two governments, misperceptions still exist in 
the relationship between Germany and Portugal; most notably on the issue of Madeira’s public 
finances (Madeira is an island that is one of the two autonomous regions of Portugal). During a 
speech in Berlin, Angela Merkel remarked on the way European funds were used by the island, 
stating that they had been wrongly spent on constructing roads and other unnecessary 
infrastructure instead of fostering the island’s competitiveness (Diário Económico, 2012). In 
reaction, several local politicians from various parties expressed their dissatisfaction and 
indignation with the chancellor’s words. 
The most common Portuguese criticism of Germany is its unsupportive attitude towards some 
of its European partners, despite the fact that these countries supported Germany during 
reunification and have provided major markets for German exports. Many commentators and 
observers also mention how Germany itself broke the rules on budgetary discipline and call for 
Berlin to be more understanding in its treatment of others. The image of a European continent 
subjugated to a ‘Pax Germanica’ that criminalises its southern partners in an attempt to pacify 
and neutralise them, is an expressive example of the way in which many Portuguese observers 
envisage German European policy (Pedro 2011, 150). According to some Portuguese political 
analysts, Germany has based its political strategies on a misreading of the euro crisis because 
the crisis of sovereign debt is the consequence of a structural error in the EMU: the power to 
issue and to devalue currency was not accompanied by the establishment of a real central bank 
or by fiscal harmonisation and a real European budget. Berlin has thus acted wrongly, even 
selfishly, by not recognising that the main priority should be finally completing the current 
EMU. 
Furthermore, several national newspapers and magazines have made negative assessments of 
Germany’s role in the crisis. Germany is accused of having disregarded the weight of history in 
its policies, of having a chancellor who is obsessed with the communist practice of “unifying 
everything,” of behaving like the "eucalyptus of Europe,"
1 and of transforming its renowned 
rigour into an obsession (Nery, 2011). 
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Running away from the Greek stigma 
A closer look at the crisis-management strategy of both the Socrates and Coelho governments 
shows that Portugal has made a great effort to differentiate itself from Greece. This has been 
apparent from the beginning of the Greek crisis and was reinforced when Portugal began to 
attract the attention of international financial markets.  
The Coelho government has been especially peremptory in stating that Portugal has complied 
with the troika memorandum by reducing its public spending and controlling its deficit. Deputy 
Minister Miguel Relvas is one of the most prominent members of the Coelho cabinet, and has 
been most active in putting into practice the government’s strategy to differentiate itself from 
Greece. Relvas stated that Portugal had taken a very different path from Greece since 2011 and 
that the two countries can no longer be put in the same basket (2011). Declarations of this kind 
have been repeated regularly. Paulo Portas, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, has stated that, 
aside from a very demanding financial adjustment, Portugal, unlike Greece, benefits from 
having a government with an absolute majority in Parliament and a wide political consensus on 
what needs to be done (2012). The Minister of the Economy, Álvaro Santos Pereira, has 
emphasised the broad agreement reached by the government, syndicates, and employers, 
envisaging a common effort by all the sectors of the economy to overcome the crisis (2012). 
Coelho himself mentioned the violence in Greece as an example of what to avoid in Portugal, 
and argued that the country can only do so by complying with the current troika agreement 
(2012). 
Differentiating itself from Greece became important for Portugal at a time when the Greek 
situation seriously deteriorated. Portugal’s reassuranes calmed the financial markets, the troika, 
and the country’s European partners. 
The rhetoric of the Socrates and Coelho governments towards Greece did not find a great deal 
of support among the public. The dominant position within Portuguese society indicated broad 
discontent with the government’s lack of solidarity towards Greece. The most visible expression 
of this discontent came from a group of 30 well-known personalities and intellectuals, whose 
manifesto stated their “solidarity towards the people of Greece” and called the Portuguese (and 
European) attitude towards Greece “no less than shocking” (Lusa, 2012). 
Conclusion 
Many political commentators, economists, political scientists, and other specialists remain 
dubious about the role Germany has played in the Portuguese and European crises. Analyses 
diverge among commentators, but most of them agree that Berlin should curb its urge to punish 
debtor countries and adopt an inclusive policy by strengthening the community method, by 
fostering a supra-nationalist vision for the EU, and by promoting solid regulation mechanisms at 
the European level. However, notwithstanding a few voices inside the Socialist Party (PS) that 
argue against the way the EU dealt with the crisis when Sócrates was prime minister, every 
political party in government (PS, PSD, and CDS) is formally committed to the troika’s 
adjustment plan and has adopted a supportive attitude towards the key objectives it pursues. In 
the end, a gap is emerging between a Portuguese government that approves Germany’s requests 
for austerity under the troika method and an opposition and civil society that is increasingly 
losing faith in the belief that growing austerity under EU/German auspices will pay off for 
Portugal. 
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France’s Partner on a Pedestal: 
A view driven by pragmatism and envy 
Claire Demesmay and Yann-Sven Rittelmeyer
* 
ince the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the old world order, the French have, in their 
collective consciousness, associated Germany with the question of their own leadership. 
The awareness that Paris’ political and diplomatic influence on the international stage has 
been eroding did not lead to resignation, but rather to an aspiration to maintain strong influence 
on European integration and, in this context, to be on a par with Germany. The financial crisis 
has helped resurrect the spectre of a symmetrical Franco-German relationship, as it has become 
more evident that both countries have been drifting apart in terms of economic performance. In 
this regard, the discourse about Franco-German cooperation has to be understood as multi-tiered 
and as a reflection of a more general French malaise. Confidence and reliability generally mark 
French perceptions of its neighbour, but misunderstandings and irritation concerning the 
political system and Berlin’s expectations vis-à-vis European politics do occur. 
Focus on Germany’s economic performance 
For a number of years now, Germany has been seen in France through an economic lens and has 
become a central point of comparison, particularly in terms of reducing unemployment, 
economic competitiveness, and export figures. For French policy-makers, researchers, and 
journalists who closely follow Germany’s economic performance, the most fascinating element 
is often how their neighbour has succeeded in overcoming its difficulties after reunification and 
turned itself into the most successful European economy – whereas France’s economy has been 
grappling with increasingly acute problems. Consequently, the French discourse on Germany 
has changed considerably over the past decade: the country has gone from the laggard of the 
late 1990s and early 2000s to today’s envied ‘German model.’ 
It is not surprising then, that Germany’s economy is a core issue in the current political debate. 
In 2012, Nicolas Sarkozy gave the ‘German model’ a prominent role in his election campaign. 
Looking for domestic answers to the economic crisis, he referred frequently to the reforms 
adopted by Berlin during the era of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. He focused on several 
arguments: quality (“Germany did it and it worked”), necessity (“Germany did it, so we have to 
do it as well”),
1 and unity (“in mimicking Germany we are supporting convergence and 
harmonisation, which are good for Europe”). After Standard & Poor’s downgraded France’s 
credit rating in January 2012, Nicolas Sarkozy addressed his calls for discipline not only to 
French voters, but also to rating agencies and France’s European partners.  
Nicolas Sarkozy’s insistence on comparing France and Germany reflected the latter’s positive 
image among voters. Nicolas Sarkozy hoped to score electoral points by referencing the 
German model. A number of polls show that over the past few decades, Germany has been 
associated with positive notions such as seriousness, discipline, and work. The deepening crisis 
apparently did not affect this opinion, as Germany’s image has actually improved during the 
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crisis (25% improved, 11% worsened, and 64% unchanged). At the beginning of the year, the 
‘German model’ was still seen positively by a large majority of French (62%).
2  
In early February 2012, the invocation of the German success story reached its peak with a joint 
TV interview by Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel that was broadcast on both French and 
German television. This unusual event triggered much media attention and launched discussions 
about the possible politicisation of the Franco-German relationship due to Chancellor Merkel’s 
explicit support for the election campaign of then President Sarkozy. The interview was 
criticised by the opposition in France, but also by Merkel’s liberal coalition partner, the FDP. 
The high degree of publicity also rubbed the French electorate up the wrong way, as they 
generally object to following external examples and prefer to decide their own way. 
Since then, the public debate has concentrated more on the negative aspects of Germany’s 
current economic situation. The press regularly publishes articles about social inequalities and 
precarious working conditions in Germany, as well as about demographic problems. In this 
context, critics mention in particular the absence of a legal minimum wage, which in France is 
seen as a central acquisition of the welfare state. The reference to the German model became so 
intense – and often superficial – that the German Ambassador in Paris felt impelled to intervene 
and to revisit “many half-truths” in a critical op-ed published in the daily newspaper Le Monde 
in mid-April 2012, focusing among other things on “one-euro jobs” and collective wage 
bargaining.
3  
How real are anti-German sentiments? 
The last few months have seen controversies not only about Germany as an economic paradigm, 
but also as France’s partner in the European Union. Analysts and politicians have questioned 
Berlin’s role in the management of the eurozone crisis – and as a mirror effect, the role of Paris. 
Traditionally, French decision-makers are in favour of an active European Central Bank (which 
should be tasked with more than merely controlling inflation) as well as of expansionist 
budgetary policies. Besides, the decision-making process in Berlin appears to be slow and 
complicated from the French perspective. The French are accustomed to centralised political 
power and a strong role for the executive. In this context, the German approach to economic 
governance has regularly been criticised as too rigid, legalistic, short-sighted, and lacking in 
sympathy and solidarity. 
The negotiations on the new European fiscal treaty at the end of 2011 (which was adopted by 25 
of the 27 European Union states in January 2012) took these differences to a more dramatic 
level. The French Socialist Party presidential campaign was marked by controversial 
declarations by Arnaud Montebourg, an increasingly important figure in the party who came in 
third during the Socialist primary election and became minister of Industry after Hollande’s 
election. In November 2011, he compared Angela Merkel’s European politics with those of 
Bismarck, accused her of trying to kill the euro, and complained about a German “diktat.”
4 
Another Socialist politician compared Nicolas Sarkozy’s trip to Berlin with Édouard Daladier’s 
visit to Munich in 1938.
5 The fact that this openly anti-German discourse emerged from 
representatives of a party already seen as the most likely to win the 2012 presidential election 
drew wide attention. So far, the party best known for such provocations is the extreme right, 
                                                      
2 Poll conducted by Ifop, «  L’image de l’Allemagne en France  », January 2012 
(http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/1735-1-study_file.pdf). 
3 Reinhard Schäfers, “Le modèle allemand est perfectible, mais il est encore trop méconnu!”, Le Monde, 
13 April 2012. 
4 Interview on Public Sénat, 30 November 2011. 
5 Note on his blog (available online: http://blog.jmlg.fr/?p=2307) and interview on LCP-Assemblée 
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whose leader, Marine Le Pen, spoke several times of a “Europe à la Schlag” – an expression 
reminiscent of the concentration camps – to refer to Germany and the austerity measures 
decided by Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy. The comments from both socialists were 
rapidly condemned by the French political class as well as by various prominent figures within 
the Socialist Party. Although their importance should not be overestimated as they clearly do 
not represent the party’s line and have been artificially amplified by the media, they 
nevertheless refer to clichés that are still present and can resurface in particular circumstances.  
So far, mutual perceptions in France and Germany seem to have been left unaffected by such 
discourses. In fact, the above-mentioned poll shows that Nazism and World War II only play a 
marginal role in the way Germany is viewed by French people. Of the main historical events 
attributed to its neighbour by the French, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of 
West and East Germany are mentioned first, particularly amongst the younger generation. Not 
only Germany (82%), but also the German Chancellor currently has a very positive image (60% 
positive, 24% negative)
6 among French people. Citizens generally have a better knowledge of 
Germany than was the case in the past and by and large understand German taxpayers’ 
reservations about continuing to show solidarity towards some member states. 
Questioning French leadership  
Behind these anti-German declarations, which can largely be attributed to domestic politics and 
do not reflect the majority of public opinion, is more sober criticism regarding the emerging 
European strategy for combating the debt crisis. French politicians do believe in austerity as an 
effective way out of the crisis. Given that France’s economic growth is based on domestic 
demand, decision-makers often see austerity as a risk that could lead to a recession. The German 
insistence on strict budget discipline has often been criticised as inequitable, inefficient, and 
even hazardous. In this regard, it is revealing that both Nicolas Sarkozy, the most constant 
defender of the fiscal treaty, and François Hollande, who acknowledges the necessity of budget 
discipline, both ended their presidential campaigns by advocating growth-promoting measures 
at the European level.  
Yet discussions about Germany and the Franco-German relationship also reflect France’s own 
national struggles to improve its economic performance and to remain a credible player in the 
European Union. Those who criticised the federal government’s position regarding EU crisis 
management also blamed Nicolas Sarkozy – albeit in a milder tone – for supposedly tagging-
along with the chancellor. “Mrs. Merkel decides, Mr. Sarkozy follows,”
7 François Hollande 
teased, promising that, if he were elected president, he would re-establish a more balanced 
relationship with Germany. The old spectre of a symmetrical relation between Paris and Berlin 
has been amplified by the crisis and is an important element of the discussion. The more serious 
France’s economic difficulties become, the stronger is the apprehension that Paris could turn 
into Berlin’s junior partner and lose its influence on European integration. The clearest 
expression of such concerns is the discussion so prominent in the media during the campaign 
about the country’s economic and political “décrochage” from Germany. It plays on fears of 
France’s disconnection and backwardness on the European scene. 
A normalised and pragmatic relationship 
Beyond all these controversies and provocations, it is worth mentioning that French politicians 
have never fundamentally questioned Franco-German cooperation. On the contrary, as debates 
about the German economic model and the attitude of the political class towards Germany 
                                                      
6 Poll Infratest Dimap, "Die deutsche Europapolitik aus französischer Perspektive," February 2012 
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became more heated, consensus grew between Conservatives and Socialists on the necessity of 
working closely with Berlin. There is no dispute about whether bilateral cooperation should be 
pursued and even intensified, only about the modalities under which it should occur. This view 
is not due to a natural preference among French decision-makers for Germany, but because of 
the pragmatic statement that nothing can be decided in the European Union without Berlin’s 
agreement. 
Such a perception has doubtlessly been influenced by a crisis that has confirmed and amplified 
Germany’s role in European integration. From this point of view, the evolution of Nicolas 
Sarkozy’s attitude towards Germany is instructive. At the beginning of his mandate in 2007, his 
Atlantic bias led him to place a strong emphasis on relations with the UK and to play down the 
importance of the Franco-German couple, which he considered insufficient in a 27-member 
Union.
8 A few years later, his language was radically different. Regarding these fluctuations, his 
position regarding the Franco-German relationship seems the result of pragmatism rather than a 
determined vision. 
That Franco-German cooperation has become a matter of necessity rather than passion for 
French politicians became clear during the 2012 presidential campaign. Although Socialist 
candidate François Hollande strongly criticised Berlin’s strategy concerning budgetary 
discipline and argued for growth promotion, he sought contact with decision-makers in Berlin. 
He regularly met with German Social Democrats, such as party leader Sigmar Gabriel, while 
also expressing his intention to cooperate closely with Merkel’s coalition government should he 
become president. It is not surprising then that his first official trip to Berlin took place on 15 
May 2012, just a few hours after his inauguration as president. Furthermore, in the past, the 
socialisation to the Franco-German relationship has proven strong. The best relationships 
between French and German leaders have been independent of political affiliation. 
The normalisation of perception of the Franco-German relationship applies not only to the 
political class, but also to the French population in general. Germany is not associated with the 
Nazi period anymore, but neither are these perceptions based on particularly strong emotions. 
The present approach is rational and pragmatic: Germany is not seen so much as a friend but 
rather as a very close partner: France’s privileged – and even best – ally. Consequently, the 
Franco-German relationship is seen as a necessary and useful tool within the EU framework that 
has to some extent moved beyond the ubiquitous emotions that formerly characterised it. 
 
                                                      
8 Joint press conference given by Nicolas Sarkozy and Gordon Brown, London, 27 March 2008.  
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Germany as Viewed by Bulgaria: 
Support for Fiscal Stability 
Antoinette Primatarova
* 
n 18 January 2012, Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov paid a visit to Berlin to 
meet with Chancellor Merkel. At the end of the press conference the Chancellor was 
asked by a reporter whether she saw any need to do more for the eurozone and other 
EU countries against the background of continued appeals to Germany to show more solidarity.  
Borisov leapfrogged Chancellor Merkel in answering the question: “On behalf of several 
countries I would like to thank Germany for being perhaps the single country that is but giving. 
I would advise my colleagues to argue less about Germany and instead worry more about their 
budget deficit and their external debt. If they would do this, they would not have to ask the 
Chancellor for more and more money. Bulgaria has been rewarded with a higher rating by the 
agencies exactly for acting like that. Countries that do deliver do also get solidarity.”
1 
Borisov has made many similar statements at the national and international levels, in private 
and in public. These statements suggest that he might be eager to breathe new life into 
Bismarck’s dubbing of the Bulgarians as “the Prussians of the Balkans,” but they put him at 
odds with other European governments and politicians who are more critical of Germany and 
Chancellor Merkel’s handling of the euro crisis. 
Borisov’s support for Chancellor Merkel did not make big headlines. Chancellor Merkel reacted 
with a benign smile and the German media all but neglected it.
2 The Wall Street Journal paid 
some modest attention to it.
3  
Support for Chancellor Merkel’s handling of the euro crisis and for Germany’s leading role in 
the EU was also expressed by newly elected Bulgarian President Rossen Plevneliev. He gave an 
interview to FT Deutschland
4 a few days after taking office with three main messages: 
•  Germany’s leadership will result in a stronger Europe; 
•  The fiscal stability advocated by Germany is a must; 
•  Bulgaria should be an example for Greece in resolving national debt.    
There are many reasons why Bulgarian support for Germany’s position in the euro crisis is not 
making headlines. Together with Romania, Bulgaria is the youngest member of the EU. It has 
little if any political or economic leverage. It has been and still is considered a laggard in many 
respects. It is the poorest EU member state, and has made more headlines with corruption and 
                                                      
* Antoinette Primatarova is Programme Director European Union at the Centre for Liberal Strategies 
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1 Press conference Chancellor Merkel/ Prime Minister Borisov, 18 January 2012 
(http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2012/01/2012-01-18-pk-bkin-
bulg-pm-borisov.html). 
2 In one of the countless German TV debates on the European fiscal crisis, Edmund Stoiber referred to 
Borisov’s proposal to Greeks to cut pensions and salaries to Bulgarian levels in order to resolve the 
country’s problems as sounding cynical but in essence being right. 
3 http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20120118-708884.html. 
4  http://www.ftd.de/politik/europa/:schuldenkrise-deutschland-wird-uns-fuehren/60161472.html, 29 
January 2012. 
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organised crime than with constructive regional policy or fiscal and financial stability. It is not 
yet part of either the Schengen area or the eurozone.     
Borisov is unique not only in his populist domestic rhetoric (which forms the basis of support 
for his party GERB),
5 but also in his means of courting international partners. He is definitely 
not unique in his pro-German position. Examples of taking Germany’s side can be found 
throughout modern Bulgarian history. Positive Bulgarian perceptions of Germany’s role in the 
EU can actually be explained by the country’s experiences throughout the transition and the pre-
accession process.  
•  The major German political foundations and parties played a very important role in the 
shaping of the political landscape in Bulgaria and the political socialisation of Bulgarian 
parties at the European level. Without the support of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and 
Germany’s Social Democrats, the Communist past of the Bulgarian Socialists would 
continue to be a serious international liability for the party and the recent election of Sergei 
Stanishev
6 as Interim President of the European Socialists would be impossible. The 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation has been very active in its support for all centre-right parties 
in Bulgaria since the very start of transition. The Hanns Seidel Foundation did much to 
contribute to the development of the GERB movement as a centre-right party. The Konrad 
Adenauer and the Hanns Seidel Foundations, as well as the Christian Democratic Union and 
the Christian Socialist Union, had an important impact on the integration of these parties 
into the European Peoples Party. For the moment, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation does 
not have any strong partners in Bulgaria, but it was also quite influential in the past. As long 
as German political parties themselves are in agreement on Germany’s role in the EU, 
uniform support for the German position is what can be expected from any Bulgarian 
government. The situation becomes more complicated when there are more differences 
between the major German political parties. Presently, the Bulgarian Socialist Party and the 
Bulgarian Socialist MEPs tend to align their position with the PES in general and with the 
German Social Democrats in particular, whereas GERB aligns its position first of all with 
Chancellor Merkel and then with the EPP.  
•  In contrast to France, which repeatedly put the brakes on EU enlargement, Germany is 
perceived by Bulgarians – politicians and citizens alike – as the driving force behind the 
fifth enlargement. The decisive role of the European Commission during EU negotiations 
was a positive experience that convinced Bulgarians (especially at the administrative level) 
of the benefits of the communitarian model (perceived as a traditional German bias). For a 
rather small country like Bulgaria, the French bias for inter-governmentalism holds no 
appeal. Thus, if there is disagreement between Germany and France, Bulgaria is more likely 
to support Germany, regardless of which government is in power.  
Two more factors explain the Bulgarian position towards the German bias towards fiscal 
stability. On the one hand is Bulgaria’s experience with fiscal stabilisation over the last 20 
years, and on the other is the perception of the current Greek crisis.  
Bulgaria defaulted twice during the transition from communism that started in 1989. The first 
time was at the very beginning of the transition in March 1990, when the Lukanov government 
had to declare a moratorium on servicing Bulgaria’s external debt. The second time came in late 
1996-early 1997 when governmental policies resulted in a persistent shortage of grain, feed, 
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fuel, and bread, an inflation rate of 310.8% in 1996 and 578% in 1997, and a decrease in the 
country’s foreign reserves in January 1997 to the fragile level of 365 million USD. As a result 
of these two crises, a currency board arrangement was introduced in 1997, and it has since been 
sustained as the backbone of a conservative and disciplined fiscal policy by successive 
Bulgarian governments. Upon taking office in 2009, the incumbent government’s aim was to 
join the ERM II as soon as possible and to adopt the euro within its term. After more than a 
decade with the currency board arrangement in place, these aims did not seem overly ambitious. 
When the environment changed thanks to the financial crisis, Borisov adjusted the original 
timetable: Bulgaria would wait for eurozone countries to fulfil the Maastricht criteria.  
Bulgaria’s record under the currency board arrangement
7 gave Borisov leeway to subscribe to 
the German-led fiscal discipline treaty, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance 
(TSCG), without serious opposition in parliament regarding the provisions on fiscal discipline. 
The Bulgarian socialists voiced serious doubts about the effectiveness of the new treaty but did 
not go as far as to vote against it; they merely abstained from voting. Thus, in late January 2012 
Borisov received a mandate from Parliament to commit Bulgaria to the new treaty, with only a 
single vote cast against it.
8  
The currency board arrangement translated into austerity measures for Bulgarian citizens that 
were more severe than the austerity measures currently being applied to Greece. As a neighbour 
country, many Bulgarians visit Greece, and their perception seems to be that the crisis there is 
rather mild compared to the crises that hit Bulgaria in the early and mid-90s. The media also 
contribute to the impression that the Greeks have been buffered from the crisis because of 
generous EU support, and that Greeks still have a much better quality of life than Bulgarians, 
regardless of the crisis. Since there was no comparable support to bail out Bulgaria when it 
would have needed it, there seems to be a certain lack of understanding for the financial support 
for Greece both at the level of ordinary citizens and politicians. This became evident in March 
2011 when the incumbent government committed Bulgaria to the Euro Plus Pact without any 
prior debate in Parliament. Media and politicians alike stirred concerns that the Euro Plus Pact 
implied disproportionate financial commitments for Bulgaria under the European Stability 
Mechanism both before and after the eventual adoption of the euro. Borisov learned his lesson 
from the debate over alleged Bulgarian contributions to save richer countries, and since then he 
is always eager to explain that he would never make any financial commitments to countries 
richer than Bulgaria itself. Against the background of the country’s own experiences, both the 
incumbent Bulgarian government and ordinary citizens seem to have a high degree of 
understanding for Germany’s insistence that solidarity and trust be conditional upon 
responsibility.   
There is one more reason for Borisov’s support for Chancellor Merkel’s line on fiscal stability. 
He seems obsessed with the belief that Bulgaria’s good record with regard to fiscal stability 
deserves some kind of reward – perhaps a decrease in national co-funding for projects under the 
EU’s cohesion, fisheries, and rural development policies. To his embarrassment, this carrot has 
been offered to crisis countries such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Romania, Latvia, and 
Hungary. In his meeting with Chancellor Merkel, Borisov raised the issue but received only a 
politely evasive answer with a hint that rewards for fiscal stability could be demanded by others 
too, not least the Eastern German Länder. This example proves that regardless of the deep 
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respect for Germany’s role within the EU, there are and will be differences between Germany 
and Bulgaria on issues beyond the Fiscal Stability Treaty.  
In the case of differences between large and small and between rich and poor countries, for 
example, Germany and Bulgaria quite naturally have different interests. The most recent case is 
the different positions taken by Germany and Bulgaria with regard to the funding of cohesion 
policy in EU's next multi-annual budget for 2014-2020. 
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Why Germany Should Re-think Competitiveness: 
A Romanian view 
Agnes Nicolescu
* 
n Romania, the popular perception of Germany’s role in the EU is positive. For the most 
part, Berlin basks in the glow of the country’s economic achievements; a particularly 
important point of reference for the Romanian economy and for domestic exports. And yet, 
this default deferral to Germany in itself highlights a potential problem for Romania: Bucharest 
is still making the transition from being a ‘policy-taker’ to a ‘policy-maker’ in EU affairs, and 
has yet to come up with critical yet constructive approaches of its own. The current debate in 
Romania surrounding important questions of European policy, such as Germany’s leadership 
role or the rationale for deepening EU integration, is still confined to rather narrow professional, 
academic, and research arenas.  
The dilemma for Romania, as a relative newcomer to the EU’s decision-making processes and 
as a country still fighting the consequences of ongoing economic and financial crisis, is whether 
it can afford to be left behind. This is without knowing the consequences of further integration 
and whether it should even dig its heels in and potentially overlook the benefits of deeper 
integration. Few authoritative voices across Romanian society have expressed serious doubts 
about the drawbacks of signing the Fiscal Pact. Bucharest’s hasty adoption of the Pact can be 
interpreted as a sign of its tendency to follow the line set by Berlin, as well revealing the lack of 
widespread public debate. This is an odd situation for any democracy dealing with such 
sensitive issues.  
Moreover, the reliance upon Germany and the EU framework has a further, structural aspect, as 
revealed by the Romanian reaction to the question of budgetary discipline. Although 
sovereignty over domestic finances is a delicate issue, the proposal (eventually rejected by the 
European Commission) on the possibility of transferring authority for national budgets to a 
European authority did not cause a major stir among Romanian finance authorities and analysts. 
On the contrary, it was generally felt that a monitoring system such as that foreseen in the Euro 
Plus Pact and later in the Fiscal Pact should have positive results for the finances and economies 
of new member states, Romania included, in terms of strengthening fiscal consolidation and 
helping them keep their budgets in line.   
Yet these institutional arrangements can only produce sustainable, positive results if states are 
actually able to implement the necessary structural reforms. In countries with weak institutional 
and administrative establishments, supranational governance would initially pay off in the form 
of increased competitiveness and financial stability, but the real challenge is to encourage these 
countries to reach increased competitiveness objectives. Only thus will they be able to ensure 
long-term financial discipline. In this regard, the competitiveness gap between southern and 
Nordic countries is only bridged in a negative sense – by the common problems they face, of 
which one of the most pressing is the continuous ageing of the European population. The 
financial impact of ageing on the population will affect both well-established pension systems 
in Nordic countries and those in the south and east. In relation to this topic, Romania is 
particularly interested in seeing how Germany will tackle the problem of its declining 
population. 
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Germany and the beginnings of a critical debate 
As with ‘old’ EU members such as Greece and Spain, the financial crisis has hit both the public 
and private sectors in Romania. Ever since the summer of 2010, there have been significant cuts 
to pensions and salaries, as well as massive lay-offs. Yet it was not until January 2012 that 
Romania witnessed major street protests. This was a turning point for the country. After several 
years during which the public’s perception of Europeanisation was generally positive, the 
negative impact of the European economic recession brought a deeper and more pragmatic 
understanding of the responsibilities entailed by EU membership. The most obvious sign of 
these stirrings of critical thinking is the current assessment by the Romanian government and 
business sector of the concrete areas in which Romania can play an important role in the 
European single market. Yet, there has been a more general shift towards critical-constructive 
reflection, as Romanians cease to view the EU as the solution to all of its domestic problems 
and begin their own programme of national reforms. 
Romanian economists point out that the Fiscal Pact may not work in the best interests of the 
Romanian economy once it goes into effect in January 2013.
1 They believe that the best that 
Romania can do for now is to continue along its own path towards budgetary discipline and to 
strive to expand its exports. Moreover, EU-inspired austerity measures have brought to light the 
fundamental necessity of renegotiating the tenets of the Romanian social model and ceasing 
reactions to cyclical economic pressures arising outside the country. There are naturally 
disagreements on how to proceed. The country’s new labour code has largely been seen by the 
Romanian business sector as a step towards more flexibility while trade unions have opposed it 
on the grounds of social security. Meanwhile, the necessity of implementing stricter rules on 
financial markets, as well as in the granting of public contracts, has become a leitmotif in 
discourses by Romanian experts. The general social dialogue, however, is dominated by worries 
over stemming the growing number of unemployed in the immediate term and the need to 
reform the labour market in the long term. Where discourses have converged, however, is in 
their scepticism about pursuing the adoption of the euro as a valid objective.  
There is also growing scepticism about the efficacy of the structural framework created by the 
EU in response to the crisis. It is not just that Romanian experts fear that the Fiscal Pact will 
represent only one in a series of further institutional commitments, adopted in order to keep up 
with the unfolding recession. The EU’s existing Stability Pact is viewed as a useful instrument 
only in the sense that it acts as a brake, preventing member states from deviating even further 
from their budgetary discipline objectives. However, any further exceptions in the enforcement 
of the Pact’s requirements would only sanction and legitimise a lack of domestic discipline. For 
this reason, Bucharest is particularly concerned that Germany will see a return to domestic 
scepticism on EU affairs. There is of course some nuance here: a 2011 GMF poll showed that 
76% of Germans were in favour of the EU while 48% of them supported the Monetary Union.
2 
While Germans remain strongly attached to the idea of ‘Europeanness’, after the onset of the 
crisis they seemed more sceptical about the financial and economic benefits associated with the 
EU. A reflection of this latter dimension would be the proposal of Hans Henkel, former 
President of the Federation of German Industries, to create a “monetary club”
3 made up only of 
Germany and Nordic countries, which abide by the fiscal rules. Regarding German domestic 
politics, the liberal Free Democrat party has become more eurosceptic over the last few years 
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while the Left Party has grown stronger in the polls. The ultimate objective of the Stability Pact 
is to ensure a budgetary precedent; Germany cannot break it again.  
Moreover, in the eyes of Romanian experts, discipline does not make sense without financial 
solidarity. Without countercyclical policies, future institutional arrangements are unlikely to pay 
off. This casts the spotlight on Germany, regarded by Romania as the anchor of the European 
economy, and ultimately as its financier of last resort. To put it diplomatically: since the 
competitiveness of the German economy lies in intra-EU exports, Berlin is in a strong position 
to understand why a fair balance between these exchanges should be struck and why it should 
allow other European countries to enter the German market. In other words, Germany’s 
competitiveness objectives should also encompass openness towards imports from EU members 
facing difficulties. Thus, the German model of export-driven growth should also target the 
commercial interests of a more global Europe rather than solely its own objectives. This 
naturally requires equal effort from the other member states to avoid seeing Berlin’s global 
economic pursuits as disconnected from the larger European policy in the field. 
Moreover, in relation to the issue of European values, and with consideration of the negative 
impact of the economic and financial crisis, Romania would particularly welcome sustained 
support from Germany in fighting the nationalist far-right movements that have flourished 
across Europe, even in countries with long democratic traditions such as Hungary and the 
Netherlands. In such periods, it has become common practice in European politics to place the 
blame for financial troubles on minorities across Europe, including on the Roma minority, 
without offering any solutions or policy proposals, except for continued discrimination, 
isolation, and direct or indirect political pressures. 
Concerns about German realism 
The fact that German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle’s first foreign visit upon taking 
office was to Poland rather than to France was perceived in Romania as an indicator of Berlin’s 
growing interest in its eastern neighbours. This eastern focus was, however, viewed with a 
certain ambivalence. Due to historical factors, Romania, just like Germany, has had sinuous 
relations with the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. German policy towards Russia, 
aiming at a normalisation of political relations based on economic cooperation, is a pragmatic 
start that might also work for Romania, without being viewed as a model per se.  
But it is worth pointing out at this juncture that Berlin’s ever-closer economic and political 
relations with Moscow, and especially its restrained stance regarding Russia’s deviations from 
democracy over the last decade, have strongly contributed to a more sombre perception of 
Berlin within the Romanian public and mass media. It has sparked historical fears about the 
ease with which a small- to medium-sized country can become caught between the (not always 
transparent) ambitions of Europe’s two major powers to the east and the west. Again, there are 
concerns in Romania about Germany’s apparent return to scepticism, conservatism, and realism 
as regards its international duties. 
Although the normalisation of relations with Russia features amongst the core priorities of 
recent Romanian foreign policy, Berlin’s close ties with Moscow are still viewed by Romanians 
with suspicion: they will not necessarily translate into better relations between Russia and the 
EU as a whole. Romania, just like Poland, guards the EU’s difficult eastern border and hence 
has a direct interest in seeing its close neighbourhood stable and secure on all flanks. Any 
enforcement or radicalisation of the direction set by Germany’s Meseberg agenda, for example 
through further agreements, would be a cause of real concern.  
But this is not just a question of securing the border and the region. It has been five years since 
the eastern border of the EU moved to the Black Sea region, and Bucharest believes Berlin 
should pay more attention to the positive potential of this connecting region for improving 
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framework has been fragmented, and a renewed understanding of this region’s importance is 
needed. Bucharest is also aware that a more coherent policy on its part is essential in order to 
utilise the full potential of multilateral cooperation. 
Germany’s responsibilities 
In the past, the principal reason for Germany’s inability to follow the precise conditions set by 
the Stability Pact was the fact that the maximum threshold of a 3% budget deficit was largely 
seen as a target to be achieved and not as a firm limitation. Today, by contrast with the early 
1990’s, any deviation from EU rules would be seen to lie much more in a growing scepticism 
and realism amongst Berlin’s political class, associated with a renewed understanding of 
national interest. This has a positive side: if Germany is now seen to keep to the EU’s new rules, 
it is likely to spark optimism and confidence in the European project. A similar dynamic 
pertains to issues of EU foreign policy as well. Berlin’s abstention on UNSC Resolution 1973 
on the Libyan no-fly zone may have been an example of its traditional attachment to pacifism. 
But there is an alternative explanation for its decision to side with the emerging economies on 
this issue: its expanding relationship with China and Russia, especially against the background 
of Berlin’s efforts to preserve the competitiveness of its exports in global markets, is seen to 
have clouded its judgement. Again, a firm commitment from Berlin to EU foreign policy would 
be a source of considerable confidence. 
With regards to the internal dimension of EU integration, Germany should conceive of 
‘competitiveness’ in terms that do not lead inexorably towards a multi-speed Europe, a 
characteristic already accentuated by the negative impact of the crisis. As 60% of German 
exports still go to European countries, this is also a good reason to advocate for a stronger 
commitment to European trade policy. In the context of the difficult negotiations on the 
financial framework for 2014-2020, and given the opposition of countries such as the UK to 
supporting a well-funded Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), Romania’s sees Germany as 
essential to reaching an agreement over the preservation of agricultural funding. Again, the 
fulfilment of this role would require Berlin to resist to any populist feelings prevalent in 
domestic public discourse.  
It is nevertheless a serious challenge to continue consolidating the European project with 
another poll conducted by a German research institute in 2011 suggesting that about 63% of 
Germans have little or no confidence in the EU. 
It is nevertheless a serious challenge to continue consolidating the European project while about 
63% of Germans have little or no confidence in the EU.
4 This comes at a time when Germany 
seems to be rethinking its approach towards Europe; this change of tone became obvious with 
Chancellor Merkel’s 2010 speech in Bruges, when a shift from the ‘community method’ to a 
more intergovernmental approach was announced. Berlin’s sense that its heavy financial 
contribution to save Greece’s economy should translate into greater political power than that 
wielded by France, and its close relations with the emerging powers in the Far East, are likely to 
challenge the current Euro-Atlantic agenda. At the same time, part of Germany’s foreign policy 
over the last decade can also be explained by the continued disengagement of the US from 
European security issues. 
Regarding the foreign policy dimension, Germany has not managed to match the influence and 
leadership it has inevitably gained due to its economic competitiveness with an equal sense of 
leadership regarding its role in the world. Indeed, until now, the European integration project 
has been seen in close connection with the objectives of the Atlantic community. Germany’s 
growing economic ties to Russia and China thus throws into question Berlin’s political 
                                                      
4 Thomas Petersen, “Gemeinsames Interesse für Europa in Gefahr”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 
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commitment to both Europeanisation and Atlanticism. It is, in short, important for member 
states to persuade Berlin that it would be beneficial for all Europeans to have a Germany that 
strongly supports the European integration process as an instrument for ensuring continued 
economic stability and security on the continent. Under current circumstances, this will prove 
extremely challenging because the German leadership is trying to offset its financial 
commitments to the eurozone with the economic and political opportunities offered by rising 
powers.  
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Perceptions of Germany and Hungary’s Self-
perception in the Euro Crisis 
László J. Kiss
* 
Tradition of bilateral relations 
Since German-Hungarian relations have never really been burdened by intractable historical 
disputes over, for example, territory or minorities, there is surprisingly little ambivalence in the 
Hungarian perception of Germany, let alone fear of German dominance or Germany’s failure to 
lead. Bilateral relations between the Federal Republic and Hungary have never ceased to be 
instrumental to Hungary’s economy and prosperity. During the euro and the broader global 
economic and financial crisis, Hungary has become more dependent on Germany’s economy, 
reaffirming the idea that no Hungarian economic recovery is possible without German 
involvement. This is one reason why Germany is perceived as an indispensable strategic partner 
and why the country’s leading economic role is accepted without political debate in Hungary; 
even to the point where acceptance of this is part of the Hungarian raison d’état, no matter 
which party comes to power in Budapest. From the beginning of the 1990s, Hungarian 
politicians have often stated that a unified Germany should assume a commensurate role both in 
Europe and in the relevant international organisations, including permanent membership in the 
Security Council.  
Fiscal discipline and ‘double standards’ 
Nevertheless, the Hungarian perception of Germany is not wholly positive. When the current 
centre-right government came to power with a two-thirds majority, it found a country in tatters 
with a dramatically increasing external debt burden and huge swathes of the population sinking 
into poverty. In its efforts to reduce the deficit, the government decided to introduce measures 
such as the temporary windfall tax on the financial, retail, energy, and telecom sectors. This 
proved exceptionally profitable, and similar banking sector taxes have since been introduced in 
various European countries. Yet, thirteen foreign companies with bases in Hungary wrote to the 
European Commission in 2010 demanding sanctions against Budapest for the special taxes. 
Their mother countries support them and are using the EU institutions to pressurise Hungary 
into lifting these burdensome taxes and to return to the status quo ante.  
Hungary’s domestic politics also received unfavourable coverage in the German media, which 
criticised the government for taking the country down the road of undemocratic and dictatorial 
development. Suddenly Hungary was no longer a ‘Musterknabe’ (model child) but a 
‘Prügelknabe’ (whipping boy) in the German and Western media. If those closest to the 
government and, indeed, mainstream public opinion are to be believed, any structural deficit in 
Hungary’s democracy has been caused by the lack of an efficient opposition, and measures 
towards centralisation are unavoidable in times of financial crisis and economic emergency. For 
its part, the weakened and divided opposition has preferred to talk of the lack of checks and 
balances. However, on losing political ground, the opposition has had no other choice but to 
‘Europeanise’ Hungary’s domestic policy and to bolster its damaged position by means of the 
international left and NGOs.   
Germany’s role as an unwilling hegemon in the euro crisis is also affecting Hungarian 
perceptions of the country.
1 Since the beginning of the crisis, Germany has turned from 
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reluctant paymaster into unbending promoter of EU-wide fiscal discipline. Berlin also helped 
bring an end to the governments of Silvio Berlusconi and George Papandreou. But even if such 
interventions took place in the spirit of ‘saving the eurozone is saving Europe,’ the manner in 
which the Greek and Italian governments were replaced has been a matter of some controversy, 
particularly given German criticism of Hungary’s democratic standards at home: budget deficits 
in both countries are to be decreased by a scaling back of democracy. Moreover, ‘European 
Germany’ has been the means of creating ‘a German Europe,’ with Berlin providing the EU 
with the vocabulary of fiscal discipline. Merkel, with Sarkozy as junior partner, acted in a strict 
and resolute way to implement the fiscal pact.   
And yet, when it came to the essence of these fiscal rules, Hungary was very much the 
Musterknabe. In the spirit of ‘strong Europe, strong Hungary,’ the Hungarian EU Council 
presidency accomplished several objectives in the first half of 2011; thereby enabling more 
fiscal stability in Europe. The agenda of the Hungarian presidency, which ranged from 
European energy policy to a Danube and Roma strategy, complemented Germany’s interest in 
making Central Europe more stable and competitive. At the end of the Hungarian presidency, 
the EU had more means of handling crisis prevention than had been available six months 
earlier. The package of six legislative proposals, aimed at strengthening economic governance 
in the bloc, was more than 95% complete in the last month of the Hungarian presidency.  
Furthermore, Hungary was amongst the first member states to insert a balanced budget rule – 
the so-called debt brake (Schuldenbremse) – into domestic constitutional law. Its new 
constitution came into force on 1 January 2012. The Hungarian government was thus at pains to 
emphasise that it had no intention of overburdening German taxpayers. Rather, the government 
would do everything it could to rely upon its own resources and gain control of the situation. 
Budapest has not been rewarded for its efforts, however. Hungary was one of the few countries 
to make progress during its presidency in preparing for the package of six EU budget discipline 
rules, only to become the first to fall foul of the package. Of course, Budapest knows that it 
could not expect to be let off merely for being quick to transpose the rules. But the manner in 
which this occurred was the source of some tension, with certain member states failing to show 
the sensitivity to Hungary’s domestic situation that they showed to other countries. 
The European Union’s standoff with Hungary exposed Brussels to charges of double standards 
and even unwarranted intervention. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán accused the European Union 
of double standards: “As a nation, we demand equal treatment. We won’t be second-class 
European citizens.” Orbán was apparently referring to the European Union’s leniency towards 
Spain; a country that will not have to cut its deficit as deeply as it was originally told to do so. 
Austria, backed by Britain, Poland, and the Czech Republic said the decision to freeze €495 
million of EU aid for Hungarian infrastructure projects should be delayed from 1 January 2013 
until June to give it more time to fix its deficit. Austria’s finance minister criticised what she 
called “double standards” and “political” sanctions against Hungary. But Germany voted to 
suspend cohesion funds against Hungary; one of the few EU countries that actually kept its 
deficit to a GDP ratio of 3% in 2011 (for the first time since 2004), even if it was the result of a 
single measure rather than a structural one. 
What makes the sanctions and sharp words from Berlin more unpalatable to Budapest is the fact 
that Hungary’s own domestic actions have been inspired by similar initiatives in Germany. In 
spite of the tense relationship between Budapest and the EU, Orbán stated that the Germans 
were still the country’s main inspiration: they were the only ones who had an economy that is 
able to provide fantastic results. It is important to note that Hungary’s own fiscal crisis preceded 
                                                                                                                                                           
1 Kiss J. László, “Hegemónia az euróválság útján, avagy a német hatalom korlátjai” (Hegemony through 
euro crisis , or limits of German power), Magyar Külügyi Intézet (Hungarian Instititute of International 
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the eurozone crisis. Indeed, since its accession to the EU, Hungary has struggled to reduce its 
deficit. The new centre-right government came to power following near state bankruptcy at the 
end of 2008, a situation that was only averted through massive loans from the IMF. Orbán 
talked about the Germans having a natural instinct for managing their economy successfully 
while the Hungarian government had to kick-start this process through their two-thirds majority 
in parliament. According to the premier, as long as the Hungarian government has this majority, 
it can foster economic recovery. In contrast to Germany’s approach of dealing with power 
cautiously, even developing a culture of restrained power, Hungary’s national conservative 
government has made full use of its power following the unprecedented parliamentary majority 
to restructure the entire political and economic system amidst a deep economic crisis. 
Critical approaches: Germany as main beneficiary and two EU peripheries  
Despite the gravity of the situation, however, most Hungarians remain philosophical and 
eschew extremist politics. The Hungarian mainstream is aware that the Germans are very 
cautious about taking a leading role, but among Central Europeans in general there is still 
nervousness about being squeezed between the Germans and the Russians yet again. The 
Hungarian premier put it this way: Germany is always seen as being too small to really 
dominate Europe, but too big to relieve the concerns of others. That is Germany’s destiny. If 
Germany uses its power for good, then other states must put aside their concerns and create an 
alliance; a partner relationship.
2 
There are also minority opinions that are more critical of Germany’s European policy, which 
contradict mainstream beliefs in many respects. According to some experts, Germany’s 
competitiveness can mainly be attributed to the structure of the EU and the euro. In this reading, 
the country’s competitive advantages were reinforced by membership in the eurozone, thanks 
not only to Germany’s huge domestic market, outstanding capital adequacy, strong 
technological sector and institutional basis, but to the entire governing and regulatory structure 
of the EU being stacked against less competitive member states. Over time, the common 
currency has become undervalued for Germany and overvalued for countries that lag behind, 
and the competitiveness gap has continued to widen between them. Furthermore, Germany’s 
major objective is not so much to preserve the unity of the euro or the Union, but to consolidate 
its great power role in the EU.
3   
Another approach assumes that ‘many Europes’ have emerged from the euro crisis. From a 
Hungarian point of view, it is extremely important to point out the existence of a so-called 
double periphery and the relationship between these peripheries in the EU. The periphery of 
states within the eurozone are seen to have a better deal than the even more disadvantaged 
periphery of Central and Eastern European member states outside the eurozone. According to 
the mainstream political elite, on the one hand the EU is throwing money into the bottomless pit 
of Greece’s debt crisis within the eurozone, and the ECB has injected over a trillion euros of 
liquidity into eurozone banks to reassure markets and prop up ailing sovereign bonds. On the 
other hand, the IMF, whose mandate is purely financial and economic, refuses to negotiate with 
the Hungarian government until it has complied with the EU’s political demands regarding laws 
and the constitution. Even then, it is unwilling to simply provide Hungary with the requested 
line of credit and insists on the country accepting a credit package. 
                                                      
2 See Occidental Observer, Interview with Viktor Orbán,  ”A majority of European leaders has lost their 
faith in what made Europe great” (www.the occidentalobserver.net/2012/03//interview-with-viktor.orban-
a-majoriry-og-european-leaders-have), 10 May 2012. 
3 Róna, Péter, “Otthon anyuka, máshol mostoha” (At home Mum, Somewehere Else Stepmother), 
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Concerns about equal standards pertain not only to the treatment of the different member states 
but also to different issues. Brussels condemns Hungary for failing to conform to certain 
‘European’ values but remains silent in the face of serious discrimination against ethnic 
minorities. According to the Hungarian mainstream, truly European values such as solidarity 
and equal standards need a rethink in the EU. From the German point of view, the requirement 
to lead and not to dominate means finding a balance between fiscal stability and growth. The 
idea of Eurobonds raises a major question that needs to be discussed: Can German solidarity 
with other member states succeed at the expense of its own society, without paying the price of 
increased domestic euroscepticism?     
  
42 | 
Austria’s Perception of Germany: 
Between admiration and scepticism 
Franco Algieri
* 
ermany is not only a neighbour but also a tangible part of daily life in Austria: Germans 
are the most numerous group of immigrants in Austria.
1 It is no surprise, then, that 
certain clichés about Germany and Germans still survive. The traditional term for 
Germans – “Piefke” – retains its less than positive connotation.
2 In Stefan Zweig’s description 
of life in old Vienna before the First World War, the German neighbours are seen as having 
little sympathy for the relaxed way of life in the Austrian capital. He describes Germans as 
being guided by the aspiration to be efficient and with a certain dislike of the supposedly 
hedonistic way of life in Vienna.
3 Given the current admiration of German tourists for the 
relaxed atmosphere in Vienna one might conclude that attitudes have changed. But what these 
tourists actually admire is the facade of a cosy imperial city where the Empress Sissy might 
walk around the corner at any moment.  
Austrians like to charm others, and themselves, with the image of their country as Europe’s 
“most beautiful and best province”.
4 Neither the political elite nor the public actually considers 
that the country plays a decisive role in the EU but, as long as being provincial has no negative 
effects for the country, there seems little need to become a driver of European integration. 
Besides, even though almost half of the Austrians still think that joining the EU was beneficial, 
scepticism and criticism towards the supranational level and the EU in general are growing. 
Like Germany, Austria is facing national elections in 2013 and consequently the scope for the 
government to play an active and positive European role is shrinking.  
Economic policy 
Austria’s government, industry and business are supportive of the strong economic performance 
of their German neighbour. Germany is widely accepted as the driver of European economic 
growth and this matters because, in 2010, over 72% of all Austrian imports and over 70% of all 
Austrian exports were in trade with EU member states. More specifically, Austria is regarded as 
the EU member state that has profited most from the eastern enlargement of the Union in terms 
                                                      
* For a German-Italian who has lived and worked in Austria for the last few years after having lived and 
worked in Germany before, it is a challenge to write about Austria’s perception of Germany in a 
European context. This would not have been possible without extremely valuable and critical discussions 
with Austrian colleagues and friends. They deserve particular gratitude for helping me understand Austria 
better. Dr. Franco Algieri is Director of Research at the Austrian Institute for European and Security 
Policy (AIES) in Maria Enzersdorf. 
1 In 2010 one of the leading Austrian newspapers ran an article about foreigners in Austria called “More 
Germans than Turks”, Die Presse, 8.7.2010 (“Ausländer in Österreich. Mehr Deutsche als Türken“) 
http://diepresse.com/home/politik/innenpolitik/579861/Auslaender-in-Oesterreich_Mehr-Deutsche-als-
Tuerken?from=suche.intern.portal. 
2 A derogatory term without precise English translation. It is doubtful whether those who use the term 
Piefke have a sound understanding of what lies behind the name. See Godeysen, Hubertus: Piefke. 
Kulturgeschichte einer Beschimpfung, Wien/Klosterneuburg 2010. 
3 Zweig, S., Die Welt von Gestern. Erinnerungen eines Europäers, Frankfurt am Main 2007, 36. Auflage, 
p. 40. 
4 Rainer Nowak, „Österreich, schönste und beste Provinz Europas“, Die Presse, special report‚ 
Aufbrüche, 25 January 2012, p. 1. 
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of trade and economic growth,
5 and the economic progress of Central and Eastern Europe is 
critically linked to Germany’s economic development.  
It also goes without saying that the Austrian economy is also directly dependent upon the 
German economy. With a share of more than 35% of Austrian trade, Germany was the most 
important trading partner in 2010.
6 Consequently, forecasts for the development of the German 
economy are carefully observed in Vienna, and it is not long before a negative forecast for 
Germany has consequences for Austria.  
As for the euro crisis, even though Austria is still considered to be a rather stable country in 
terms of its finances, the negative effects of developments in Greece and other EU member 
states seriously affected by the crisis are followed closely in the country. This is again linked to 
corresponding debates in Germany and decisions taken by the German government. As in 
Germany, there is no unified opinion in Austria about the measures that should be taken to 
manage the crisis in a European context. Until now, the Austrian government has largely 
followed the steps taken by the German government and many view the strong (and strict) 
position of German Chancellor Angela Merkel positively. However, in recent times the effects 
of a strict policy of austerity have been questioned more often in Austrian debates. 
European security and defence policy 
During the first Austrian EU presidency in the second half of 1998, a remarkable development 
began for EU security and defence policy when the then Austrian Defence Minister Werner 
Fasslabend convened the first informal meeting of EU defence ministers. In order to make such 
a meeting politically acceptable for other EU member states, consultation with the German 
government was integral, since any step in this policy field cannot be taken without consulting 
with the big member states. And in the early years of the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) (now the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)), Austria looked with great 
interest at German attitudes towards the Europeanisation of security and defence. One essential 
aspect was (and still is) that the legitimacy and development of Austrian defence policy would 
be best viewed in a European context, and this in turn requires German action.  
But, the times they are a-changin
7 and today the security and defence debate in Austria has 
become a marginal topic. The country is split on the purpose and use of their armed forces, 
which are facing an enduring existential crisis. While some continue to uphold the banner of 
neutrality, others are trying to improve Austria’s role as a security and defence actor in the 
framework of the CSDP. The pros and cons of more Austrian engagement in European security 
and defence policy are debated in both parties of the grand coalition, i.e. the social democratic 
SPÖ and the conservative ÖVP. However, the supporters for CSDP are well aware that Austria 
cannot move ahead in a European context without delivering results and being supported by 
like-minded states. Consequently, several options can be distinguished in this context: a) 
cooperation with neutral and non-aligned countries, b) working with Central European 
countries, or c) rapprochement with the big three (France, Germany, and the UK). Looking at 
the draft of Austria’s new security strategy, Austria wants to (at least conceptually) maintain an 
ambitious role inside the CSDP, but whether the necessary steps will be taken is doubtful.
8  
                                                      
5 Breuss, Fritz: “Die Zukunft Europas”, in Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Familie und Jugend, Das 
österreichische Außenwirtschaftsleitbild. Globalisierung gestalten – Erfolg durch Offenheit und 
Innovation. Wien 2009, 2
nd edition, pp. 33-63, here p. 61. 
6 Statistik Austria 2011, Statistische Nachrichten 8/2011, Wien 2011, pp. 813-815. 
7 Bob Dylan, released as the title-track of his 1964 album, “The Times They Are a-Changin'”. 
8 See Franco Algieri/Arnold Kammel, „Des Kaisers neue Kleider. Europapolitische Aspekte im Entwurf 
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For Austria (as for other smaller EU member states) it is important to carve out a position in the 
ongoing process of defining and structuring European defence. Being part of the ‘influence 
game’ would allow those states “to prevent the larger states either acting outside the 
institutional frameworks or, indeed, the wholesale and progressive renationalisation of security 
and defence efforts taking place, which is a danger.”
9 Suspicion concerning the goodwill of the 
three big EU member states, including Germany, remains. Many ask whether they are really that 
united, how differences among them might deepen, and what consequences this may have for 
smaller member states.
10 There are demands that smaller member states should work together 
more closely in order to prevent the bigger states from determining the rules of the European 
game.
11 But, despite growing disappointment at the indecisiveness of Germany in the field of 
CSDP, it remains to be seen whether Austria could be the driver of such a development.  
Austria as a small state cannot afford – even though this is often the reality – to be left behind 
by other European states in European and global affairs.
12 But as in Germany, a gap can be 
found between the theoretical necessity of deeper European integration on the one hand and 
domestically oriented political realities on the other hand. 
Germany and the future of European integration 
Times are also changing with respect to how close political actors in Germany and Austria are 
to one another. While former CDU German Chancellor Helmut Kohl was seen as a friend of 
Austria, his SPD successor Gerhard Schröder and his Green Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer 
had a less positive image in Austria. This was due not least to the critical positioning of the then 
German government during the period when Austria was sanctioned by other EU member 
states.
13 The perception of the current CDU Chancellor Angela Merkel as a (once) powerful 
actor for European integration (recalling the German role in moving out of the constitutional 
crisis and paving the way towards the Lisbon Treaty), which was also positive for Austria, is 
slowly fading. And the longer the eurozone financial crisis lasts, the more doubts will grow 
about how Germany will be able to handle the crisis-management of the common currency. 
The Austrian perception of Germany’s role in the European integration process vacillates 
between admiration and scepticism. In the end, the high degree of interdependence between the 
two countries, bilaterally as well as in the European context, will make it necessary for Austria 
to continue its pragmatic relationship with Germany in the EU. In the past an unspoken 
consensus existed between the two major Austrian parties, the SPÖ and ÖVP, which implied 
that in the event of any move towards a kind of ‘core Europe’, Austria wanted to be part of that 
core. Currently, such a consensus is less evident. Nevertheless, if Germany is moving the 
process of European integration towards a core Europe, then it can be expected that Austria will 
follow that course and not be left behind.  
                                                      
9 Julian Lindley-French, „The influence game. The meaning of defence for smaller Europeans“, in 
Pucher, Johann/Frank, Johann (eds), Strategie und Sicherheit 2011. Globale Herausforderungen – 
globale Antworten, Wien 2011, pp. 365-373, here 372. 
10 See in this context Andreas Unterberger, “Die Grenzen verschwimmen. Österreichs Sicherheit in einer 
sich verändernden Welt”, in Pucher/Frank (eds), op. cit, pp. 543-553, here p. 548. 
11 See the Austrian MEP Hannes Swoboda, „Zur internationalen Rolle Österreichs in einer sich 
verändernden Welt“, in Pucher/Frank (eds), op. cit., pp. 501-511, here p. 508. 
12 See in this context also Erhard Busek, „Sicherheit – ein Thema für Österreich“, in Pucher/Frank (eds), 
op. cit., pp. 527-532. 
13 See Michael Gehler, Der lange Weg nach Europa. Österreich vom Ende der Monarchie bis zur EU. 
Darstellung. Innsbruck et al., 2002, pp. 443-444.  
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Good Neighbours, not Strategic Allies? 
German EU policy as seen from Prague 
David Král
* 
he importance of Germany for the Czech Republic is beyond doubt: Germany is the 
Czechs’ largest and most populous neighbour and its biggest trading partner, consuming 
more than 30% of Czech exports; their shared land border is the second longest for both; 
German tourists are still the most numerous visitors to the Czech Republic; and Germans are the 
second largest group of non-Czech EU residents in the Czech Republic (after Slovaks). 
Sociologists describe the Czech perception of Germany as an ambivalent mix of fear and 
admiration (especially with an eye to German economic strength), but it has improved markedly 
in recent years. Opinion polls in 2010 showed growing sympathy towards Germans and 
Germany,
1 especially among the younger generation.  
The complicated historical relations between the two countries and the unresolved issues arising 
from them (such as possible property claims on the part of Sudeten Germans expelled from 
Czechoslovakia after WWII) have been largely de-politicised and conferred to historians. The 
political agenda is instead dominated by future-oriented problems. But, while there is no doubt 
that Germany is recognised as a key player in the European arena by the Czech political class, 
acceptance of German leadership varies – it at once is welcomed, accepted, contested, seen as 
inevitable, and viewed with suspicion and caution. Moreover, the current Czech perspective of 
Czech-German relations is almost exclusively bilateral, which leads to the fading importance of 
the Czech Republic for Germany when it comes to dealing with EU-wide issues, despite their 
geographical proximity and economic interconnectivity.  
Writing about the Czech perception of Germany’s EU policy is thus rather challenging. The 
political class in the Czech Republic is more deeply divided than in most other EU states, 
notably over the question of where the European Union is heading and whether Germany is 
pulling it in the right direction. The disagreements go beyond the coalition/opposition cleavage. 
Even within government, the two main coalition partners (ODS – the Civil Democratic Party 
and TOP09 – Tradition, Responsibility, Prosperity Party), as much as they might agree on many 
domestic economic issues, have rather opposing views on Europe. Indeed, TOP09 and the 
opposition Social Democrats (CSSD) have far fewer qualms about accepting the German vision 
of a stronger role for the European Commission and the European Parliament, a shift of 
competencies to the EU level, common economic governance, and, in the case of the Social 
Democrats, even some kind of fiscal harmonisation.  
The fact that the two governing parties each control one of the two key institutions responsible 
for EU affairs – the Office of Government or Prime Minister’s office (ODS) and the Foreign 
Ministry (TOP09) – has led to unprecedented clashes over the EU agenda (most notably on the 
fiscal pact) and culminated in both the prime minister and foreign minister appointing deputies 
who are each supposed to be responsible for the EU agenda as a whole. This potentially 
                                                      
* David Král is Director of EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy in Prague. 
1 According to a 2010 CVVM poll, relations with Germany are considered to be the third best after 
Slovakia and Poland, among 13 countries surveyed, with 89% of respondents viewing them as very 
positive or rather positive (compared to 77% in 2000).  In terms of overall sympathies, in a similar 2010 
poll Germany ranked middle behind Slovakia, France, the UK, Austria, Poland, the US, and Japan – 
ahead of Hungary, Russia, Cuba, Ukraine, China, and Israel. For the press releases relating to these polls, 
see  http://www.cvvm.cas.cz/upl/zpravy/101082s_pm101221b.pdf and 
http://www.cvvm.cas.cz/upl/zpravy/101081s_pm101221a.pdf (in Czech only).  
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explosive mix (set to become one of the decisive factors in the next parliamentary election) is 
not helped by the fervent euroscepticism of Czech President Václav Klaus. He has set the tone 
of public debate in the past two years, contributing to the growing euroscepticism charted in 
opinion polls, including Eurobarometer.
2  
Relations with Germany have been further complicated by the parties of the current coalition 
government in Prague having no natural counterpart in the Federal Republic. This matters 
because many issues are discussed bi- and multi-laterally not only among governments, but also 
between the political parties. ODS is not part of the EPP (which includes the CDU) but has 
aligned itself more with the British Conservatives and PiS of Poland in the ECR group. The 
natural counterpart of the CDU, the Christian Democratic Party (KDU-ČSL), is not currently 
represented in the Czech parliament and is unlikely to make a comeback. TOP09, while being 
an EPP member, is a new party, which has not created many links with its European 
counterparts yet and has no seats in the European Parliament. The smallest coalition partner – 
the Public Affairs Party (VV) – is in the process of disintegration and is unlikely to survive. By 
contrast, the Social Democrats enjoy numerous and fruitful contacts with their German 
counterpart (the SPD), not least on EU issues; they are, however, in opposition. 
Business as usual? Agreements and disagreements over policy issues 
On most aspects of EU policy, relations between Prague and Berlin are characterised by minor 
agreements and disagreements. In the area of EU foreign policy, for example, Germany and the 
Czech Republic work together as part of the Eastern Partnership. The Czechs, seeing themselves 
as one of the spiritual fathers of this initiative, praise the active role that Germany has played 
vis-à-vis the EU’s eastern neighbours and view Berlin as a necessary counterweight to countries 
such as Spain, Italy, and France that push for a greater focus on the Southern Mediterranean. 
But disagreements do arise when it comes to Russia. Many (though not all) Czechs are reluctant 
to recognise Russia as a strategic partner, and view the German position as too uncritical of 
domestic Russian developments. Regarding further enlargement, both countries are actively 
involved in the Western Balkans and they share a desire for the region’s eventual incorporation 
into the EU. Differences arise in relation to Turkey: while the current German government 
prefers a privileged partnership, Czech governments – regardless of their political stripe – 
generally recognise Turkey’s potential to become a fully-fledged member of the EU.  
Similarities in the structure of the German and Czech economies (especially in terms of the 
large share of industry and the dominance of exports, which amount to 50% of German GDP 
and 80% of Czech GDP) lead to correlations in relevant EU policies: both countries share a 
similar interest in trade liberalisation with third parties and are interested in providing support 
for industry, as well as fostering European competitiveness and a functioning single market. 
Moreover, in discussions on the growth agenda, both countries now seem to believe that the 
‘completion’ and liberalisation of the internal market is a better way to boost growth in Europe 
than government-funded stimulus packages; a position that many southern members of the EU 
(including France) tend not to agree with.  
Berlin and Prague have diverging views on energy and climate change. Germany is concerned 
with reducing greenhouse emissions and increasing the share of renewables in its energy mix. 
The Czech Republic considers itself more constrained in this respect because of a landscape that 
provides little by way of water, solar or wind power and is dispensing with a series of coal 
power plants that cannot easily be replaced. Although the EU does not mandate the nature of a 
country’s energy mix, both countries are pursuing distinctly different paths. While Germany has 
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decided to shut down its nuclear power plants, Prague sees nuclear energy as the cornerstone of 
its energy security and has launched a huge tender for the extension of the Temelín nuclear 
power plant in southern Bohemia. Given its proximity to Germany, one can expect pressure 
(especially from Bavaria) on the German federal government to convince Prague to withdraw 
the tender (although Chancellor Angela Merkel has excluded this). A change in the Czech 
government is unlikely to yield a U-turn in the Czech position, as only the Green Party is 
currently opposed to increasing the proportion of nuclear energy in the Czech energy mix (the 
party is in fact against nuclear power altogether).  
The German decision to abandon nuclear power has triggered another concern: that those 
German companies (especially RWE) which have invested in the Czech energy sector will sell 
their Czech acquisitions so that they can increase their investments in Germany’s altered energy 
landscape. Since Russian companies would be among the likely buyers, Czech politicians 
(especially on the political right) view this as a security risk, and fear that this perception is not 
shared by their German counterparts. Another source of concern for the Czechs is the overflow 
of wind-generated electricity from the German state of Saxony, which has previously brought 
the Czech electricity transfer system to the verge of collapse. Energy interconnectivity between 
the member states is one area where even the Czech government would have no problem 
shifting more decision-making to Brussels.  
EU economic policy: the current debt crisis and economic governance 
The eurozone crisis is where real divergences between the two current governments have come 
to a head. Prague has largely endorsed the ‘German medicine’: bringing government deficit and 
debts under control while pushing austerity measures in favour of balanced budgets and prudent 
macroeconomic policies. The government sees the Czech Republic as part of a fiscally 
responsible northern zone where Germany is a natural leader. This helps explain the lively 
debate as to whether the Czech Republic should participate in the EFSF through loans to the 
IMF. Although the government finally endorsed taking part in the fund, their participation 
would be at a substantially lower level than that proposed by the European Commission. The 
Czech government is wary of Czech public opinion, which is strongly opposed to providing 
loans to countries whose economic policy is viewed as irresponsible – a sentiment that is 
expressed in both Czech and German public debates.  
However, the agreement between the two governments pertains only to the substance and not to 
the form of the response. It seems that Prime Minister Nečas is a priori opposed to any further 
“surrender” of Czech sovereignty and to giving the Commission and fellow member states 
oversight of the Czech budget.
3 Nečas apparently sees the fiscal compact and the measures that 
preceded it (such as the Euro Plus Pact) as heralding a federalisation of the eurozone and the 
EU. But the disagreement stems from a misperception on the part of the ODS: while for them 
giving more power to the EU would mean more bureaucracy and centralisation, Merkel’s 
reading is different, entailing a balance between ‘community’ and ‘union’ methods. The 
opposition Social Democrats and ODS’ coalition partner TOP09 did indeed argue that the fiscal 
pact would not represent any limitation of Czech sovereignty until the country adopts the euro 
and that the pact’s adoption would actually guarantee the Czechs a seat at the table when major 
economic issues are being discussed. However, neither party pushed the issue strongly enough 
to change the PM’s position. The TOP09 leader Karel Schwarzenberg initially threatened to pull 
out of the coalition if the Czech Republic does not sign the pact, but then softened his stance, 
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claiming that it would be possible to accede to it at a later stage thanks to the likelihood of 
Klaus vetoing the arrangement.  
Both for the intergovernmental method?  
ODS strongly favours the intergovernmental method at the EU level, believing that it not only 
preserves sovereignty for the member states in crucial issues but is also more legitimate than the 
traditional ‘community method’ which ODS politicians continue to associate with Berlin. This 
position was articulated at a recent joint lecture by Nečas and Chancellor Merkel in the Law 
Faculty in Prague, where one of the ten theses presented by Nečas was that the European 
Council must play a key role in the EU’s future strategic decisions. This preference for the 
intergovernmental method is deeply rooted in ODS ideology and stems from the Manifesto of 
Czech Euro-realism, a party document written by MEP Jan Zahradil and adopted in the early 
2000s, which still serves as the bible for ODS EU policy. Nečas’s suspicion of the Commission 
and the European Parliament is notorious. 
Paradoxically, however, the EU’s recent swing to inter-governmentalism has not been 
welcomed by ODS. Prime Minister Nečas has complained that the deal on the Euro Plus Pact 
(which the Czech Republic did not sign) was a Franco-German deal put to him as a “fait 
accompli.” The ODS has difficulty accepting a Franco-German tandem which, in its opinion, is 
driving the EU towards a European super-state. It is not the first time the government has 
struggled to reconcile the principle of safeguarding sovereignty with practical implications. PM 
Nečas is also ambivalent about the emergence of a multi-speed Europe in which the Czech 
Republic might be marginalised. Although Nečas has admitted that the EU has always been a 
political project,
4 for him the main task is preserving and consolidating the single market 
without any ambition to proceed with integration in other areas (especially a fiscal union). He 
recognises a particular need for the eurozone to integrate further, but he speaks more of 
“variable geometry” whereby core policies are shared by everyone and the rest is shared 
according to the preferences of individual member states.  
Yet ODS remains strongly opposed to giving the EU more power, calling instead for the re-
nationalisation of some policies (although the party did not specify which ones, we can assume 
that it would most like to de-communitarise aspects of the Common Agricultural Policy). This 
is in line with one point that the Czech delegation advocated for strongly in the Lisbon Treaty – 
the so-called ‘reverse passerelle’ whereby it would be possible for the European Council to 
‘return’ some communitarised (or unionised) capabilities back to the capitals without a treaty 
change. This is in striking contrast to Merkel’s recent remarks in Prague on the need to enhance 
the competences of the European Union (albeit under strong subsidiarity scrutiny) especially in 
the area of economic governance. The ODS also believes that a shift of decision-making to the 
EU level cannot simply be legitimised by giving more powers to the European Commission or 
to the European Parliament, as in their view these bodies still lack the legitimacy enjoyed by 
national governments.  
Structurally, however, there are interesting parallels between the two countries with regard to 
the institutional checks placed on any shift of competencies to the EU. One is the extremely 
active role that their respective constitutional courts play in scrutinising the EU treaties, 
especially in determining the limits of sovereignty transfers. In this respect, the court in Brno 
takes inspiration from the deliberations and rulings of its Karlsruhe counterpart, something 
apparent in the three rulings on the Lisbon Treaty initiated by the Senate. Moreover, 
parliamentary scrutiny of the EU subsidiary principle in the Czech case (especially in the 
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Senate) is very much inspired by the activism of the Bundesrat in Germany. This points to a 
rather legalistic approach to EU-related issues in the Czech Republic that is inspired by German 
jurisprudence and also to the preponderance of legal experts dealing with EU issues in the PM’s 
office, compared to the low numbers of political scientists and economists.  
Concluding remarks 
It is clear that there is a substantial divergence between Prague and Berlin regarding the future 
of Europe. The main cleavage stems from the fact that the Czech Republic is not in the 
eurozone and the current government has not sent any signals as to when it intends to join. The 
Czechs recognise that the eurozone has to consolidate and integrate further, but because of their 
hesitancy, they have adopted a very low profile in the discussions on how to tackle the debt 
crisis. Although the Czechs largely endorse the flavour of the German proposals, their rejection 
of the Euro Plus Pact and the fiscal pact points to a scepticism about whether the eurozone can 
survive in its current form, and at times it seems (and this is also reflected in some of the Czech 
media) that the optimal scenario would be the creation of a new, ‘German’ or ‘northern’ 
eurozone that the Czech Republic, as a fiscally prudent and macro-economically responsible 
country, could join.  
The current Czech government cannot be counted on as a strategic ally or as a supporter of 
Germany in the EU. Prague has been sending strong signals that it counts on a strategic 
partnership with London rather than with Berlin, and has repeatedly failed to send signals on the 
kind of German leadership it would like to see. The Czechs are becoming strategically marginal, 
if not irrelevant, for Germany, as illustrated by the fact that Karel Schwarzenberg was not 
invited to a recent informal brainstorming session for selected EU foreign ministers in Berlin. 
Although ODS frequently criticises Germany for its hegemony in solving EU problems, it 
(unlike Poland) fails to see that this is not done by choice but by default, and it underestimates 
the risk of an inward-looking, eurosceptic Germany and what this might imply for the Czech 
position within the EU.  
This attitude is, however, likely to change with the government in Prague. The Social 
Democrats are clearly in favour of swift adoption of the euro, and would probably have much 
less of a problem with accepting some of Germany’s ideas on the institutional framework for 
economic governance. TOP09 is a little less pronounced in its position on the euro, but both 
parties would be strongly opposed to the Czech Republic’s current self-marginalisation within 
the EU. Unlike ODS, which sees the current development of the EU in purely ideological terms 
(i.e. as a process leading to centralisation, federalisation, and the transfer to more competences 
to the EU-level, with Germany as a hegemon), the other two parties see European integration as 
a strategic choice where they want to play an active and constructive role with Germany as a 
crucial actor with whom they need to and want to actively cooperate.   
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“Provided you include us in decision-making, Poland 
will support you” – 
German EU Policy as viewed by Poland 
Agnieszka Łada
1* 
ermany is Poland’s largest EU neighbour. Numerous conflicts between the two 
countries have led many Poles to see Germany as a threat and as a state that longs for 
domination. But this situation changed in 1989. Germany supported Poland’s 
transformation and helped the country join the European community. As a consequence, 
relations between the two states began to take on more of a ‘big brother – younger brother’ 
quality. Poland’s accession to the European Union, and the (at least theoretical) parity with 
Germany within the Union, added a new dimension to their common relations and perceptions, 
especially within the European arena.  
Today, Polish-German bilateral relations are the best they have been for years. There are no 
significant problems, although, as between all neighbours, there are always questions that need 
to be discussed or resolved. The Polish government and the majority of Poles deem relations to 
be good to very good. Three quarters of respondents believe that the two countries should 
concentrate on the present and the future, not on the past.
2 Germany continues to be Poland’s 
most important economic partner, and for Germany Poland is an even more valuable export 
market than Russia. Poles living in Germany form the third largest foreign minority group after 
Turks and Italians (around 7%). Roughly 11,000 Polish students currently study at German 
universities, and around 550 partnerships between Polish and German cities have been 
established. Polish and German NGOs are linked in innumerable joint projects. These networks 
mean that Polish-German proximity in the EU is in the interest of both countries.  
Poland’s assessment of Germany is also influenced by its perception of its own role within the 
European Union. From the moment of its accession to power in 2007, the current Polish 
government has established for itself a good position in the EU based on clear policies, the 
launch of initiatives like the Eastern Partnership, its capacity for coalition-building, and its 
exceptional economic indicators. This, together with the fact that Poland is the EU’s sixth 
largest country, means that Warsaw no longer wants to be seen as a ‘new’ member state that 
merely implements directives inspired by others, especially by Germany. It perceives itself as a 
partner with equal rights, including deeper cooperation with the German-French tandem. The 
Polish EU Council Presidency in the second half of 2011, which was efficient and successful in 
light of the complicated economic and international situation,
3 confirmed the positive 
perception of Poland in Europe.  
                                                      
* NOTE: The citation in the title is from Radosław Sikorski, “Poland and the future of the European 
Union”, Berlin, 28 November 2011. 
1 Agnieszka Łada, PhD, is the Head of the European Programme and a Senior Analyst at the Institute of 
Public Affairs in Warsaw. 
2 A.Łada, Patrzymy w przyszłość, Instytut Spraw Publicznych, Warszawa, 2011. 
3 Agnieszka Łada and Jacek Kucharczyk, “Pole Position: Polish Presidency of the EU Council” 
(http://www.boell.eu/web/270-798.html), Agnieszka Łada, Polnische Ratspräsidentschaft. Bestandene 
Reifeprüfung in Krisenzeiten, IFRI, 2012 (http://ifri.org/?page=detail-contribution&id=7053&lang=fr); 
Christian Schmitz, Agnieszka Lada, Wahlen in Warschau, Verhandlungen in Brüssel. Die polnischen 
Parlamentswahlen und die EU-Ratspräsidentschaft, Auslandsinformationen der Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung, February 2012( http://www.kas.de/wf/de/33.30193/).  
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However, while Warsaw currently aspires to a greater role in the EU, there are a number of 
obstacles that hold the country back. First, Poland has an influential right-wing opposition that 
is sceptical of the EU (led by the Law and Justice Party, headed by Jarosław Kaczyński, and a 
group of dissidents who moved even further right from this party). Even though it has no chance 
of coming back to power in the next three years, its destructive attitude colours debates on 
Europe in the country. Such debates rarely take place, however, and usually lack merit. Poland 
thus still has a problem defining its own vision for the EU; a fact that prevents Warsaw from 
moving from policy-taker to policy-maker. Last but surely not least, for the country is still 
waiting to join the most significant area of EU integration (the euro), Poland cannot take part in 
many important aspects of European policy-making. 
Berlin has to get used to Poland’s new ambitions and their limitations. But the timing is 
welcome: being confronted with the task of salvaging the European project and identifying a 
similar mentality in Poland, as well as the parallel prescription of a debt brake as a part of 
Polish law, Germany has begun to perceive its Eastern neighbour as a reliable ally, and 
sometimes even as a counterweight to France. 
Leadership, solidarity, and self-interest 
The best summary of the Polish government’s approach towards German EU-policy was 
expressed in Berlin in November 2011 by the Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski during 
a speech on the future of Europe. It is worth quoting him at length:  
“What, as Poland’s foreign minister, do I regard as the biggest threat to the security 
and prosperity of Poland today, on 28th November 2011? It’s not terrorism, it’s not the 
Taliban, and it’s certainly not German tanks. It’s not even Russian missiles, which 
President Medvedev has just threatened to deploy on the EU’s border. The biggest 
threat to the security and prosperity of Poland would be the collapse of the eurozone.  
And I demand of Germany that, for your own sake and for ours, you help it survive and 
prosper. You know full well that nobody else can do it. I will probably be first Polish 
foreign minister in history to say so, but here it is: I fear German power less than I am 
beginning to fear German inactivity. […] You have become Europe’s indispensable 
nation. You may not fail to lead. Not dominate, but to lead in reform.”
4  
Coming from a Pole, these words are exceptionally strong. However, it was not said without 
regard for self-interest. The minister pointed out very clearly what he expects from Berlin in 
exchange for this assignment of leadership in Europe: “[p]rovided you include us in decision-
making, Poland will support you.”
5 
In earlier sections of the speech, Sikorski declared himself in favour of the construction of a 
strong European Union and a strengthening of European institutions, the Parliament, and the 
Commission as a counterweight to the strong position of some states. This agenda was not 
necessarily welcomed by the Germans, but as it turned out Sikorski’s words were appreciated 
amongst their target audience – in Berlin and other European capitals. Poland directly 
demanded that the Germans become active and finally present its vision of Europe. But there 
were not many innovative ideas that hadn’t already been discussed by other EU actors and the 
obstacles inherent in the Polish wish to be an important player were not resolved in this one 
evening. The speech was not, however, universally praised – the minister was harshly criticised 
by the right-wing Polish opposition. They reproached the government for giving itself up to 
German wishes. The biggest opposition party, Law and Justice (PiS), vows to keep the most 
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important powers for the nation states and holds that German politics constitute a threat rather 
than an opportunity for Poland.  
Despite this criticism, Poland maintained its efforts to strengthen German engagement. In his 
March 2012 “exposé,” Sikorski acknowledges:  
“[w]hether we look at its population, GDP, or the voting powers acquired under the 
Lisbon Treaty, Germany is the biggest shareholder in the European Union. The 
‘biggest’ – with around one-quarter of shares – but not the ‘dominant’ one. This means 
that it is difficult to get anything done in the EU against Germany’s will, but it also 
means that in order to implement its ideas, Germany must look for more than just one 
partner. If a given endeavour is at risk, obviously it is the biggest shareholder that has 
the greatest responsibility – and the most means – to come to the rescue. We want to 
work together towards a stronger Union.”
6  
The government’s support for Germany’s plan to stabilise the euro crisis and Warsaw’s offer of 
assistance also derive from pragmatic calculations: it is only worth cooperating with a strong 
partner if this furthers one’s own interests. But such a position would be impossible if there 
were not broad agreement between the two countries on most questions pertaining to the future 
of the Union. 
The Polish government was clearly in favour of the fiscal pact from the beginning, but on 
condition that Poland, although not part of the eurozone, would have a seat at the table. 
Warsaw’s main fear is the creation of a ‘Europe of two speeds,’ where Poland would end up 
excluded from core decision-making. Berlin has given assurances to this effect, but Warsaw 
remains sceptical and perhaps a little insecure: Would Berlin really accept Warsaw as a member 
of the inner circle? 
Polish-German cooperation can also be seen in the Eastern Partnership, although the two 
countries are not in agreement on all issues. Poland initiated this programme and tries to bring 
the Eastern neighbours as close to the European Union as possible. One of the most important 
issues for Warsaw is the speedy abolition of visas for the six Eastern countries. Poland 
understands that giving their citizens the opportunity to experience what democracy, the rule of 
law and freedom mean by spending time in EU countries is the best way to bring them round to 
reforming their own system. Germany, fearful of too much migration, is not a proponent of visa 
liberalisation in the short term. But both countries tend to work together within the Eastern 
Partnership on different levels. For example, the German and Polish foreign ministers visited 
Kiev (2009) and Minsk (2010) together to underline their shared attitude towards the 
development of the initiative.  
The major point of division concerns the future of EU funding. Poland, the main beneficiary of 
EU funds and Germany, the biggest contributor, simply cannot reach a common view on this 
issue. These differences are particularly visible on the issue of cohesion policy. Here, Germany 
wants to reduce funding whereas Poland wants it to be left, at least at current levels.  
It is worth pointing out that both capitals are also clearly divided in their approach to climate 
policy. Germany, which has spent years restructuring its energy sector towards more renewable 
sources, has asked other member states to follow suit. For Poland’s coal-based economy that is 
still under development, this would result in much higher costs. When Poland votes against 
Germany on such matters, however, it is inconsistent with the principle of solidarity so often 
cited by Poland. Whereas Warsaw is in favour of solidarity in the context of support by richer 
states for poorer states (a higher budget for cohesion policy), and willing to participate in the 
implementation of protective financial rules (signing the fiscal pact as a non-member of the 
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eurozone), it does not feel obligated to show solidarity in the fight against climate change, 
arguing that it cannot afford it for the time being.  
Public perceptions of German EU policy 
Polish society has a positive view of German EU policy – in its attitude towards German plans 
for the development of the EU as well as towards the areas of Polish-German cooperation. 
Eighty-one percent of Poles support Poland’s EU membership. This has remained constant 
since Polish EU accession. In spite of the financial crisis, Poles are still convinced that a 
deepening of EU integration would be in their country’s interest (62%). Accordingly, they agree 
with the point of view expressed by Radosław Sikorski in Berlin. At the same time, they think 
that deeper integration would have a higher pay-off for the biggest states such as Germany and 
France (58%). Around half of Polish people think that this would result in a German-dominated 
Europe.  
The fiscal pact, initiated by Germany, was supported before Poland signed it by 42% of 
respondents, with 35% against. The majority accepted the principles of the contract, which were 
derived from German propositions: increased control of government budgets within the 
eurozone by EU institutions (62%) and punishment for eurozone governments that do not 
commit to fiscal discipline in their public budgets (65%).  
A 2011 study by the Warsaw Institute of Public Affairs shows that Poles see a need for 
cooperation with Germany in many different areas. The issues chosen reveal a high degree of 
pragmatism and mainly concern European internal affairs. Relatively low importance is 
accorded to cooperation in EU foreign affairs.  
Poles see the greatest need for Polish-German cooperation in the fight against the economic 
crisis and terrorism (77%). Almost as important are support for less-developed regions and the 
technological development of the European economy (73%), support for European agriculture 
and EU energy independence (71%), and the fight against climate change (67%). Together, 
Poland and Germany should also support the transition towards democracy and market 
economies in Eastern Europe and Russia.
7  
As for German European policy, in 2010 a strong majority of Poles believed that Germany was 
improving cooperation in Europe (69%). This represented an increase of several percentage 
points compared to the results just after the country’s accession to the EU in 2005 (65%). At the 
same time, more than half of Poles (54%) are of the opinion that Germany pursues its own 
interests in Europe, yet respects the interests of other countries. And two thirds of Poles (65%) 
think that Germany supports the deepening of European integration, with only 11% 
disagreeing.
8 
All these figures show quite clearly that Polish society is not only in favour of strong Polish-
German cooperation, but also of close contacts at European level, which could motivate the 
Polish government to act. But much depends on the German position. If Poland is too often left 
aside and German moves do not correspond with their promises to let Poland play an important 
role at Berlin’s side, the anti-German slogans spread by the Polish right wing will find fertile 
ground to flourish in society. 
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Closing remarks 
The Polish attitude towards German European policy is in flux. It ranges from fears of German 
domination, which might be a threat to Poland, to support for German leadership, which is seen 
as a chance to safeguard the proper functioning of the EU. At any rate, Polish support for 
German activities is contingent upon German assurances of mutual decision-making. Poland is 
interested in strengthening the EU institutions to balance the strong German position, but it is 
also eager to accept reforms and show willingness to make necessary changes to the EU and be 
accepted as a solid partner within the community. The Polish point of view is, however, very 
dependent on the current incumbent party governing in Warsaw.  
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Germany’s Response to the Euro Crisis: 
The View from Britain 
Hans Kundnani
* 
n the last 20 years, Britain seems to have overcome its post-war inferiority complex towards 
Germany. Its long and vexed relationship with Germany since 1945 goes back not so much 
to the war itself, as is sometimes assumed, but rather to a sense of having “won the war but 
lost the peace.” Since the late 1990s, however, the pervasive feeling in the UK towards 
Germany has not been antipathy, as some Germans still tend to think, but rather apathy. This 
change was reflected in British tabloid newspaper coverage of Germany: since its climax in the 
mid-90s, anti-German sentiment has become less virulent. In fact, Germany disappeared almost 
entirely from most British newspapers. 
But that has now changed. Since the beginning of the euro crisis two years ago, there has been a 
re-emergence of British antipathy towards Germany. Of course, this is not just a British 
phenomenon. In fact, it has been more prevalent and virulent in indebted eurozone countries 
such as Greece, where protesters have burned German flags and compared Chancellor Angela 
Merkel to Hitler.
1 The tragedy of the euro crisis is that, as Gideon Rachman has put it, “a single 
currency that was meant to bring Europeans together is instead driving them apart.”
2 Moreover, 
as Germany is perceived as the most powerful country in the European Union, and Europe’s 
response to the euro crisis is increasingly seen as determined by Berlin, Germany is being 
conflated with the EU – a new and particularly worrying development. 
Criticism of Germany in the UK during the last two years should thus not be seen simply as a 
re-emergence of old-fashioned Germanophobia. It is based not so much on prejudice than on a 
genuine sense of bafflement – and fear – at current developments. One often hears the view 
expressed that Germans simply ‘don’t get it’ – that is, they don’t understand macroeconomics. It 
is not just a phenomenon of the Eurosceptic and xenophobic right but also of the traditionally 
Europhile left. In fact, the Keynesian left finds the German response to the euro crisis even more 
baffling than the monetarist right, which tends to be more hawkish on austerity and therefore 
has more sympathy with the German approach – even if it is also uncomfortable with the idea of 
a German-dominated Europe. 
In fact, against the background of the euro crisis, the old current of right-wing British 
Euroscepticism and Germanophobia and a new current of left-wing opposition to austerity are 
converging and increasing both Euroscepticism and anti-German feeling in the UK. While the 
right agrees with austerity, it opposes the greater European integration that it sees Germany 
demanding. Meanwhile the left is somewhat more sympathetic to European integration but 
opposes Germany’s imposition of austerity on the rest of Europe for both democratic and 
economic reasons. Both, however, increasingly see Germany as the problem. As a result, after a 
period in which Britain and Germany appeared to be becoming closer, Britain’s relationship 
with Germany is now deteriorating due to the euro crisis. 
The UK’s longstanding approach to Europe, based on the idea of semi-detachment, has become 
increasingly difficult to maintain since the deepening of European integration in the 1990s and 
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in particular with the creation of the single currency; trends that further marginalised the UK 
within the EU while strengthening British Euroscepticism. The euro crisis has further 
exacerbated this marginalisation and strengthened Euroscepticism. In particular, the steps 
towards greater integration that have been taken by eurozone countries in response to the crisis 
have presented Britain with a dilemma: it enjoys little influence over developments that could 
nevertheless directly affect British interests and above all the City. This dilemma culminated in 
Prime Minister David Cameron’s opposition to an amendment of the European treaties at the 
European summit in December 2011. 
From the British point of view, the basic dilemma is that further European integration, and in 
particular the idea of a ‘fiscal union,’ is both economically necessary and politically 
impossible.
3 Hence Britain’s slightly schizophrenic approach: in July 2011, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer George Osborne talked of the “inexorable logic” of fiscal union; but in December 
Cameron opposed the proposed establishment of a “fiscal union” within the European treaties. 
Since the December summit, the UK’s economic and political interests have been out of sync: 
the government wants the euro to survive in order to prevent a huge recession; but at the same 
time wants to prevent the UK from being further marginalised within the EU, as is likely to 
happen if the “fiscal union” succeeds. 
As for the specific economic questions that have been posed by the crisis, it is difficult to 
generalise about attitudes within the British political class. In Berlin, there is a basic consensus 
around the idea of the social market economy. In the UK, on the other hand, the left and right 
have radically different views of economics: the right tends to be Friedmanite and the left more 
Keynesian. Nevertheless, it is possible to speak of a British mainstream view, which includes 
both the Cameron government (though not all Eurosceptic Conservatives) and the Labour 
opposition, which wants the eurozone to do what it takes to save the single currency but also to 
protect British national interests – above all the City.  
Both the left and right in Britain see the eurozone as a flawed construction. They believe it is 
impossible to have a common currency without a common treasury. Such convictions were 
indeed part of the reason for the British opt-out when the single currency was created. Many 
British politicians believe a mutualisation of debt is now required – thus Cameron has talked 
about the need for a system of fiscal transfers and collective debt issuance.
4 Connected to this is 
the belief that the single currency has in effect distorted the European economy. Politicians see 
not just fiscal indiscipline but rather economic imbalances within the eurozone as part of the 
problem: Cameron argued that the euro crisis was “a problem of trade deficits, not just budget 
deficits” and urged countries such as Germany to cut their trade surpluses.
5 In fact, many people 
in Britain seem to share George Soros’s view that Germany has a “chronic trade surplus.”
6 
As a result, few people in Britain see austerity alone as the solution to the current crisis, as 
many in Germany seem to. The British left thinks austerity has gone too far and wants to slow 
the pace of deficit reduction in Europe and would shift some of the focus onto stimulating 
economies. Even the right accepts that, although austerity is necessary, it is not sufficient: 
growth stimulation is necessary as well. Both the left and right also accept that in a global 
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economy or single currency zone it is risky for all states to tighten monetary and fiscal policy at 
the same time. They fear that what Martin Wolf has called “kamikaze tightening” will increase 
rather than reduce debt in the eurozone periphery and thus make the problem worse.
7 In short, 
the British view is that you cannot simply universalise German policy. 
In addition, both the left and right dislike the idea of Germany imposing austerity on others in 
the eurozone, which seems to them both anti-democratic and unsustainable. In fact, both right-
wing and left-wing newspapers in the UK are now accusing Germany of imperialism. Simon 
Heffer wrote in the right-wing Daily Mail in November 2011 of “Germany's economic 
colonisation of Europe.”
8 At the end of January 2012, following the revelation in the Financial 
Times of a plan to install a budget commissioner to oversee Greek spending, an editorial in the 
Guardian – hardly a Germanophobe newspaper – also accused Germany of “fiscal imperialism” 
and said it planned to create “the eurozone equivalent of a modern-day viceroy” in Greece.
9 (In 
fact, the idea of a budget commissioner was originally a Dutch one.) “This is not a monetary 
union,” wrote Martin Wolf in the Financial Times in May. “It is far more like an empire.”
10 
Just as there is broad agreement that Germany’s focus on austerity is the wrong approach to 
solving the crisis, so there is also a consensus that France and Germany are wrong to target the 
City. Of course, the British are themselves not uncritical of their financial services sector. 
Specifically, they share German anger at the banks and in particular at bankers’ bonuses. In 
January 2012, for example, the chief executive of the Royal Bank of Scotland, Stephen Hester, 
was forced to give in to massive media and public pressure and forgo a 1 million-pound bonus 
for 2011 (on top of a 1.2 million-pound salary). The government also accepted in full the 
recommendations of the Vickers report published in September 2011, which included the 
separation of retail and investment banking. There is also a new post-crisis consensus in Britain 
about the need to “rebalance” the economy away from financial services towards 
manufacturing. 
However, despite this anger, it is hard to imagine even Ed Miliband describing the world of 
finance as his “true adversary” as his French counterpart François Hollande did.
11 Except on the 
far left, ‘shadow banking’ (structured investment vehicles, hedge funds, money market funds, 
etc.) is not generally seen as a problem in the same way as it is in Germany, and hedge funds 
have never generally been perceived as ‘Heuschrecken,’ or ‘locusts.’ Thus there is less support 
in the UK for a financial transaction tax (FTT) than in France or Germany. The European 
Commission proposes to tax shares and bonds at a rate of 0.1% and derivative contracts at a rate 
of 0.01% across the EU and to put two-thirds of revenues into the EU budget. This is seen as 
inherently unfair in the UK: it is generally expected that around 75% of revenues would be from 
the UK. Thus Cameron called the FTT “quite simply madness.”
12 
Measures such as the FTT that have been taken or are being proposed in response to the euro 
crisis have put Cameron under greater pressure to accede to the demands of the Eurosceptic 
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wing of the Conservative party – which has become stronger during the last decade and in 
particular sees its opposition to British membership of the single currency as having been 
vindicated by the euro crisis – for an in-out referendum on British membership of the EU. Last 
October, 81 Tory MPs defied a three-line whip and voted in favour of such a referendum. 
Cameron’s approach at the European summit in December 2011 was in part a response to this 
rebellion. 
There is now a real possibility that the UK will leave the EU in the next five to ten years. Even 
if Cameron is successful in avoiding a referendum while he is prime minister, his successor as 
leader of the Conservative party could well promise to hold a referendum if elected in order to 
gain support from Eurosceptics (one possible candidate, Boris Johnson, has already committed 
himself to a referendum). The outcome of such a referendum is difficult to predict and will 
likely depend to a large extent on the comparative economic situation in the eurozone and the 
UK at the time. But if the “fiscal compact” is folded back into the European treaties at some 
point in the future, as the European Commission proposes, the UK may in any case think it has 
little choice but to leave the EU altogether.  
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Germany and the EU as Seen from Copenhagen 
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The historical roots of Danish relations with Germany  
Since the Middle Ages, Denmark has played host to immigration and cultural influences from 
Germany. At the beginning of the 19th century, German was even the language of the army and 
enjoyed an equal footing with Danish in the administrative sector. The loss of the duchies of 
Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg, however, saw Germany replace Sweden as Denmark’s 
archrival. The loss sowed the seeds of scepticism and mistrust towards Germany among a large 
part of the Danish population. Even after Northern Schleswig returned to Denmark by 
referendum, the border issue remained sensitive and Germany’s offensive and often aggressive 
foreign policy was a preoccupation for Denmark’s own foreign and security policy. This 
situation culminated during the Second World War when Denmark was occupied by Germany, 
leaving a lasting negative image of Germany among a large part of the Danish population, not 
least the older generation.  
In the post-war era however, Denmark followed a twin-track approach towards Germany, 
bilaterally seeking stable and peaceful neighbourly relations while at the same time supporting 
German integration into multilateral structures (NATO, the EU, UN, etc.). Denmark later 
supported German membership in NATO and in 1962 established a common NATO-command, 
BALTAP, which linked the defences of Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein, and Hamburg and 
allowed for the posting of German troops on Danish soil. In this way, Germany became one of 
Denmark’s closest partners, most prominently in defence and the economy. In 1955 Denmark 
and Germany signed the Copenhagen/Bonn-Declarations on the treatment of national minorities 
on each side of the border – a model for cross-border cooperation and the treatment of national 
minorities. And although Danish PM Poul Schlüter (he himself coming from the border region) 
initially expressed hesitation on the German unification process, Denmark supported unification 
without reservations while strongly underlining the wish for a unified Germany being solidly 
integrated within European structures. 
Denmark’s European policy has thus always taken Germany’s political development as a key 
point of reference. And while officially Denmark was quick to give up reservations towards 
(Western) Germany, popular resentment towards Germany largely remained – founded both on 
historical experience and on the fact that Germany was the ‘big’ neighbour to the south. Over 
time, distrust of Germany became synonymous with a broader euroscepticism that developed in 
Denmark up to and after the referendum on membership in the (then) European Community in 
1972. This too had historical roots. Denmark had been liberated by the British, and after World 
War II, the country’s politicians and public looked to the West for security. Strong Atlanticism 
and a pro-American attitude replaced Danish neutrality and led Denmark into NATO. This 
move was conceived partly as a contrast to a European path, and Denmark thus refrained from 
joining the WEU. This policy of anchoring Denmark in transatlantic rather than European 
security structures persists today and still enjoys broad political and public support. Denmark 
has an opt-out for the CSDP. 
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Danish/German relations in the EU  
The desire to anchor Germany in European structures and Denmark in transatlantic ones meant 
that European policy was practically the only major field of foreign policy where Denmark and 
Germany followed different paths. But German reunification and the collapse of communism 
led to a more positive attitude towards EU integration. Germany’s growing stature led Denmark 
to invest more heavily in the EU as a means to anchor Germany in multilateral structures. With 
Germany traditionally viewing further integration positively, Denmark joined the EC in 1973. 
Its considerable exports to Germany weighed heavily in the Danish decision to join the EU. For 
years, Germany has been by far Denmark’s largest trading partner. In 2010 almost 17% of 
Danish exports went to Germany, totalling nearly €15 billion. Another aspect of Danish 
dependence on Germany is the fact that the Danish currency – the crown – has been linked to 
the deutsche mark and then to the euro via a fixed exchange rate policy since 1982. The Danish 
economy has been reliant upon economic developments in Germany for three decades. One 
could argue that Germany, even after the introduction of the euro, has served as an economic 
anchor for Denmark. Danish European policy has thus been dominated from the outset more by 
economic cost/benefit considerations and commercial interests than by political conviction, let 
alone commitment to the European project. Although Danish politicians have become more 
open to political integration over time – and even dare to speak out loud about it! – remnants of 
this dominant economic cost/benefit approach to the EU are still detectable, perhaps due to the 
continued and significant presence of EU sceptics among the population. 
During its years of EU membership, Denmark has followed a course of ‘non alliance.’ Despite 
its de facto dependence upon Germany, the country has sought to maximise its interests with 
shifting partners and to avoid any formal cooperation ties with other member states such as the 
Benelux countries. During the 1970s and 80s, Denmark tended to orient itself more to the UK’s 
line of pragmatic economic cooperation with reservations regarding political integration. Yet 
German unification and EU enlargement to the East were turning points, and successive Danish 
governments have regarded strengthened EU cooperation as a means of European stabilisation 
and solidarity. In the 1990s, the majority of Danish politicians gradually adopted a cautiously 
positive attitude towards European cooperation and started to look more to Berlin. Whereas 
Denmark previously tended to regard the EU as a predominantly economic cooperation partner 
(“The Union is stone dead” as former PM Schlüter stated in 1986), Danish politicians after 1990 
started speaking openly of the political aspects of European integration.  
This habit of turning to deeper European integration whenever difficult external factors make it 
necessary has not always gone down well with the public. Danish scepticism towards the EU 
was on display leading to the ‘No’ vote (and to Danish opt-outs) during the referendum on the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (and later on joining the eurozone in 2000). Although not equally 
widespread today, popular scepticism towards European integration remains at a rather high 
level in Denmark, at least with regard to particular issues like joining the euro. Maintaining 
Danish sovereignty, however symbolic and formal, also carries a lot of weight among many 
Danes. 
Germany and the financial crisis seen from a Danish perspective 
As a non-member of the eurozone, Denmark has not been at the centre of discussions in recent 
years. But Denmark has striven to participate as closely as possible – within the limits of the 
Danish opt-out – in cooperation with the euro countries because of the Danish linkage to the 
euro. Unlike Sweden, Denmark joined the Euro-plus Pact in March 2011. Danish Minister of 
Economy Margrethe Vestager rejected claims that the national German budget-restraint ‘model’ 
had been transferred to EU level. In her opinion it has grown out of a common European 
ambition to handle the crisis in the best way possible: “There’s nothing particularly German 
about it – on the contrary, it’s more European.” Indeed, Danish Prime Minister Helle Thorning-GERMANY AND THE EU AS SEEN FROM COPENHAGEN | 61 
 
Schmidt has recognised and praised the role of Germany and the leadership of Chancellor 
Merkel in bringing about a solution to the Greek problem and paving the way for the fiscal 
compact. The notion of a Germany acting more in accordance with national interests than with 
European interests that may no longer serve as Europe’s ‘paymaster’ has not given rise to any 
larger public or political debate in Denmark. A large majority in the Danish Parliament supports 
the fiscal compact, and public polls also suggest a large majority in favour.  
This is not to deny differences of opinion. The Danish government certainly supports the kind 
of budgetary restraint advocated by Germany, but Copenhagen wants to strike a balance 
between consolidation and growth. Fiscal discipline is seen as the precondition for growth and 
employment but it will not suffice to bring the EU out of its current crisis. Denmark thus 
advocates a transfer of the national Danish economic ‘kick start’ to the EU level. The Danish 
EU presidency noted with great satisfaction how Chancellor Merkel acknowledged growth and 
employment  measures  as necessary steps  out of  the crisis in early 2012. This was later 
expressed in the Declaration on Growth and Jobs from the European Council in March 2012. 
Moreover, Denmark, like Germany, acknowledges that the solution to the current crisis is more 
Europe, not less. But, in contrast to Germany’s more federalist visions, Denmark favours a 
strengthening of cooperation within the existing institutional framework, with a focus on 
achieving practical results. Denmark initially expressed a wish not to make changes to the 
Treaty in connection with the fiscal compact. It wanted to save time for the Danish presidency 
in the first half of 2012 – and to avoid the necessity of a Danish referendum. Only when it 
became clear that Germany and France would insist did the Danish government accept this and 
concentrate its efforts on keeping the 27 member states together and limit the changes as far as 
possible. Denmark attaches great importance to the EU's formal decision-making procedures, 
insisting that decisions concerning all 27 member states are made as far as possible among all 
27 (and not in selected capitals or exclusive groups). The Danish PM said in the European 
Parliament on 18 January 2012: “The Community method should be preserved and protected. 
We need to rely on the strong rules and institutions for decision-making that are already firmly 
established in our Union.” As President of the Council, Denmark puts more emphasis on 
holding together the 27 and seeks to act as a bridge between eurozone countries and non-euro 
countries.  
Furthermore, the financial crisis has given rise to a debate on legitimacy. The debate in 
Germany has focused on increased powers for national parliaments, as reflected both in the 
demands of the Bundestag and Bundesrat and by way of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (German 
Constitutional Court). Denmark and Germany seem to follow the same path of strong and 
increased parliamentary involvement in the national EU decision-making process, albeit for 
somewhat different reasons. Denmark has a long tradition of involving Parliament deeply in the 
national EU decision-making process by way of its parliamentary committee on Europe. The 
Danish parliament also demands greater influence as a result of the fiscal compact, which gives 
the Commission oversight and influence on national budgets. However, no major public or 
political voices have called for consolidating further powers in the European Parliament as some 
in Germany have. The EP does not enjoy any particular respect – or recognition – among most 
Danes.  
German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle recently suggested the need for a publicly elected 
chairman of the European Council and a European “Verfassung” (constitution). The ruling 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) also wants to see the Commission President elected directly 
in order to boost the legitimacy of the office. Danish Foreign Minister Villy Søvndal turned 
down these proposals on 11 March 2012: 
“It is obvious that we do many things together, Germany and Denmark. But there are 
areas where we do not agree. We see no need to write a new treaty or constitution. And 
we see no need for a common European president, so there we differ”. He continued: 62 | PETER MUNK JENSEN 
 
“[t]here is always reason to discuss the public foundation of the European project... but 
I'm not sure that the conclusions Westerwelle has arrived at are the right ones”.  
Despite these points of difference, only the far-right Dansk Folkeparti (DF) has voiced 
scepticism towards Germany – and this was in connection with Germany’s critique of 
Denmark’s plan to reinforce border controls following the crisis in the Schengen Area following 
the Arab Spring. DF leader Pia Kjaersgaard told the Germans to “run and jump” and accused 
Germany of acting as a “gang of toughs” towards Denmark. DF Member of Parliament Jesper 
Langballe accused Germany of being “a neurotic nation constantly haunted by its shadows from 
the past. And in its desperate attempt to defy its Nazi past Germany uses the EU to create that 
supranational monster who shall tame the fire of nationalism.” In a television debate, DF MEP 
Morten Messerschmidt accused Germany of making Europe’s decisions. “Europe is no longer 
run from Brussels but from Berlin.” However, these statements are exceptions and do not 
resonate broadly in the public or among politicians. Despite rather widespread EU scepticism 
among the population, Danes tend to regard Germany in the EU more positively. 
Conclusion 
The Danish position is based equally on conviction and pragmatism. Denmark takes stock of the 
centre of gravity for EU cooperation – and it is evidently in Berlin. Denmark thus orients itself 
increasingly towards Berlin without abandoning its policy of ‘non-alliance’ that has been a 
guiding principle since Danish EU membership in 1973. Ever since the early 1990s, when 
Danish EU policy gradually evolved towards closer political co-operation, it has pursued a 
rapprochement with Germany.  
Part of the Danish population – mostly elderly people – remains sceptical of the EU and 
Germany. This is due to historical experience, fear of domination from Brussels or Berlin, 
strong emphasis on the maintenance of formal/symbolic sovereignty, a feeling of strong 
attachment to the UK and the US, and other more individual reasons. But over time Danish 
resentment of the EU and of Germany seems to be fading.  
The notions of sovereignty and independence have changed in the era of globalisation. Many 
Danes realise that national sovereignty can best (and only) be asserted in close cooperation with 
one’s partners. Opening up to more EU cooperation, and thus ‘more Germany’, appears to be 
more acceptable than before.  
An increasing number of Danes – most notably young people – seem to view both the EU and 
Germany with a more open mind and without the fear of EU or German domination felt by 
former generations. The younger generations did not experience the German occupation and 
only have experience of dealing with a cooperative and non-aggressive Germany. The Danish 
public’s positive attitude towards Germany is reflected by the fact that Berlin attracts tens of 
thousands of Danish tourists and Danes buy property in the city. In addition, Germany has been 
by far Denmark’s largest trading partner for years. 
Many people on the Danish left have also changed their views on the EU and now tend to 
regard it as a bulwark against unbridled free market forces. The Danish right has actually 
become more sceptical towards the EU and has criticised its unnecessary regulations and 
overwhelming bureaucracy.  
Denmark seems most likely to follow a course of pragmatic steps towards closer EU 
cooperation. Provided that the referendum on some of the Danish opt-outs results in their 
abolishment, this might pave the way for a further Danish rapprochement with Germany in the 
EU – short of the most federal visions. Should the opt-outs remain, it is unlikely that the Danish 
government would feel tempted to follow the same course. 
From the Danish point of view, the recent decision for a new tunnel connecting Denmark and 
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Denmark’s orientation towards Europe. Paradoxically, Denmark’s more open attitude  after 
years of reservations and scepticism regarding Germany and the EU has been met with a more 
cautious German attitude! Germany does not seem to share Denmark’s enthusiasm and has left 
the Danes to pick up the bill for the tunnel. This has given the impression of German 
reservations both to the bilateral and European bearing and perspective of the project. In light of 
Danish-German relations, this is a historical irony!  
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erman and Finnish approaches to EU politics are surprisingly similar when one takes 
into account how different each state’s role is in Europe. Germany is a founding 
member, is at the heart of Europe geographically, and politically at its core. Finland 
joined the EU in 1995, thus becoming the Union’s north-eastern periphery. Germany is the 
largest EU member state, whereas Finland, with its population of some 5 million citizens, is 
among the most sparsely populated countries in Europe. Finally, Germany provides a 
fundamental contribution to EU economic governance, while Finland’s contribution remains 
marginal. For instance, Finland’s contribution to the ESM is about 1.8% of the fund, compared 
to Germany’s 27%. 
Despite these differences, both countries have – at least traditionally – been described as 
intuitively pro-European. They have engaged intensively from the beginning of European 
projects such as the common currency. In general, Germany and Finland have shown clear 
constructive and pragmatic approaches to common policy-making compared to their closest 
reference group of countries: France, the UK and the Nordic countries, respectively. Finland is 
the only Nordic country that is simultaneously a member of the EU and the eurozone with no de 
jure (Denmark) or de facto (Sweden) opt-outs.  
Rather than standing alone, Germany and Finland prefer to be active members of a larger 
community. But what kind of community? The greatest difference between German and Finnish 
EU policy is their understanding of how to develop EU institutional structures and policy-
making processes. In all, Finland is more reserved than Germany as regards a more federal 
union. The country is however a strong supporter of the community method and dislikes current 
intergovernmental trends, as the latter is problematic for smaller states. 
With such background factors in mind, this article discusses how German EU policy is currently 
viewed in Finland. The aim is to consider how strong German leadership is viewed by Finns and 
how Finnish EU policy is being tailored to the new political-economic situation in Europe.  
Finnish views on German leadership in economic governance   
Since the start of the current economic crisis, Germany has been criticised by its European 
partners for first not making decisions and then for making wrong decisions. Germany has been 
blamed for its narcissistic economic and monetary policy choices as well as for trying to export 
its own domestic model of economic governance to the rest of Europe. In Finland, however, 
such criticism is rare and is only found at the fringes of public debate. Even when the economic 
policy initiatives emanating from Brussels are not considered a success, the Finnish mainstream 
refrains from blaming German economic leadership for making things worse. It is rather the 
countries that fail to follow Germany’s lead that are to blame.
1  
These positive associations with the German brand can be explained in part by the generally 
close relations between Finland and Germany. In addition to the Nordic countries, Germany is 
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often regarded as the country whose interests are most similar to those of Finland. Germany is 
an even more important reference point in the realm of EU affairs because its role is more 
central and its political engagement more stable than that of the Nordic countries. But the quiet 
respect for Germany in Finnish political discourse is also related to the country’s self-image. A 
national stereotype in Finland holds that the Finns are hard-working rule-followers like the 
Germans,
2 with both countries’ political culture focused on pragmatic problem-solving. 
Subsequently, Germany’s macro-economic approach to the European economic crisis has been 
largely supported by the current and previous governments in Finland. First, Helsinki stresses 
the same priorities as the German leadership when it comes to economic policy-making: first 
common rules, then perhaps pan-European solidarity. Finland’s national position is supportive 
of strong fiscal discipline for all member states, strict loan conditionality in terms of austerity 
measures, and tougher regulations for the financial markets, including the EU-wide financial 
transaction tax. These principles not only enjoy Finnish support, but could double as the Finnish 
solution to the crisis. 
The so-called six-pack of legislative measures and the European Semester have been welcomed 
by successive Finnish governments as tools that will strengthen economic coordination. The 
same applies to the Euro Plus Pact (“competitiveness pact”), including its aim to coordinate tax 
policies to prevent fraud and tax evasion. Finnish centre-right ministers in particular have 
recently placed a strong emphasis on the growth and competitiveness agenda as well as on the 
completion of the EU’s internal market with a digital internal market. In sum, economic 
discipline, enforceable common rules, and European competitiveness in global markets have 
been the cornerstones of Finnish economic reasoning during the crisis.    
But any moves towards a ‘transfer’ union are a no-go in Finland. Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen 
is not alone in strongly arguing against Eurobonds, stating that even if the bonds were designed 
to encourage strict budgetary discipline, they would end up encouraging more lax national 
expenditures.
3 Shared responsibility for sovereign debts is such an unpopular idea in Finland 
that there are really no political parties or individual opinion leaders that openly promote 
Eurobonds as the solution to the crisis.   
In this context, of course, it is worth stating that the Finnish position is a result of continuous 
negotiations within a coalition government formed by the prime minister’s centre-right National 
Coalition Party (NCP) and Finance Minister Jutta Urpilainen’s Social Democratic Party (SDP). 
Although there are four other smaller parties in the government, this coalition can only function 
by finding workable compromises on EU affairs between the NCP and the SDP.  
This is due to the fact that there are strong eurosceptic, or at least euro-concerned, voices in the 
opposition. The Eurosceptic True Finns Party (official name in English is “the Finns”) holds 39 
seats in the 200-member parliament, which makes it the third largest party after the NCP (44 
seats) and the SDP (42 seats). The Centre Party, which led the previous pro-European coalition 
government, lost the last elections and gained only 35 seats. Due to this electoral defeat, the 
party’s young pro-European leadership is about to step down and the party’s eurosceptic 
honorary chair is among the candidates for the new party leadership.     
In this context, fear of losing electoral support has meant that even the centre-left SDP has 
become more cautious in EU affairs than it was during previous decades. Its more reserved 
stance can also be explained by trans-national party politics: the centre-right family of European 
political parties – including the German CDU – has recently been much more influential in 
leading EU economic governance than Europe’s centre-left parties. Although the Finnish Social 
                                                      
2 Cf. with Honor Mahony’s feature in EUobserver on 22 February 2012, “National stereotyping – the 
eurozone’s other story” (http://euobserver.com/843/115340).  
3 PM Jyrki Katainen, Speech at the Future of Europe seminar, Helsinki, 7 September 2011.   66 | KAISA KORHONEN 
 
Democrats remain pro-EU and pro-euro, there has been some friction within the government. 
Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja (SDP) has, for instance, argued against the official 
government position and suggested that Finland should remain outside the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance (TSCG). FM Tuomioja particularly disliked the 0.5% GDP 
structural budget deficit rule and feared for the Treaty’s impact on the EU’s institutional set-up.
4 
The Finnish party-political landscape is more eurosceptic than in Germany, and the Finnish 
party-political compromise over EU economic governance remains delicate. For the time being, 
Finland has nevertheless aligned itself with German EMU policy. But this relative harmony 
does not pertain to the development of EU decision-making methods. In that case, Finnish views 
are more critical. 
Finnish concerns over crisis decision-making  
At present, there are two dimensions to Finland’s self-image as an EU member state. On the one 
hand, Finland has positioned itself as one of the EU’s few AAA-rated member states and the 
country sees itself as a member state that has taken good care of its national economy.
5 This, the 
government believes, gives Finland the right to have a relatively strong say in EU economic 
affairs. On the other hand, Finland has been continuously reminded of its small state status. 
Franco-German bilateral negotiations before meetings of the European Council are perceived as 
infringements of legitimate decision-making methods, and many argue that such bilateral 
compromises weaken the negotiation position of smaller member states.   
This Finnish fear of being excluded from the de facto negotiation table was not as pronounced 
during the early years of Finnish EU membership. For a long time, Finnish-German interests in 
EU institutional affairs were similar enough to create a perception that Germany supported 
small states’ call for a voice. Both countries have traditionally been in favour of deeper 
integration and strong institutions.
6 Yet, Finnish public opinion has been –and remains – more 
critical of a federal EU than Germany, where European integration is not seen as infringing on 
state sovereignty but as empowering Germany to become a ‘normal’ state. In Finland, a federal 
system, on the other hand, is somewhat inaccurately linked with the centralisation of power in 
Brussels and seen as reducing small states’ influence compared to the present confederation 
model.  
Finland’s small state identity was made apparent in this regard during the European Convention 
2002-2003 and the following Intergovernmental Conferences: Franco-German proposals were 
interpreted as a step away from the principle of equality between states.
7 This trend has been 
accelerating during the past few years of crisis management. Divisions between small and large 
member states have become ever more pronounced due to Franco-German dominance and 
intergovernmental practices applied to the most central decisions. Because changing the Treaty 
to move towards a federal union is difficult to achieve, Germany has increasingly applied the 
intergovernmental method of decision-making, which is most famously embodied in Chancellor 
Merkel’s Union method
8 and the intergovernmental TSCG.  
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Instead of intergovernmental methods of policy or treaty-making, Finland supports extensive 
use of the community method and favours a strong Commission. Some argue that the 
negotiating position of small member states is weakened by the empowerment of both formal 
and informal European Council meetings and of its president Herman Van Rompuy at the cost 
of the Commission. Besides the fact that power politics does not serve small states, the extra-
constitutional Franco-German way of initiating common European policies is problematic 
because the decision-making cycle is shorter and leaves little time for preparations at the 
national level. In Finland, this change is a cause for concern across party lines because the 
Finnish pro-integrationist position is linked with an understanding of the EU as a confederation 
based upon the principle of equality between states. 
Most recent opinion polls show that the Finnish leadership is not alone in its concerns. 
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned discourse that Finland’s voice has been relatively strong 
due to its AAA-status, 74% of Finns agree with the statement: “the hegemony of large member 
states has continuously increased in the EU.”
9 The same poll from March 2012 shows that only 
9% of Finns support developments towards a European federation.
10 
During its 17 years of EU membership, Finland has not always shared German preferences for 
further integration, but it has been open to compromise in the end.
11 But if Germany were now 
to propose a more federal model, meaning for example that the number of MEPs would more 
directly reflect the population of member states,
12 it would be difficult to find a political 
compromise in Finland that would enable the country to follow the German leadership. 
A recent example illustrates the more reserved Finnish approach to deeper integration. In 
December 2011 the Constitutional Affairs Committee of the Finnish Parliament argued that the 
draft proposal for the European Stability Mechanism infringed upon state sovereignty because it 
included a QMV decision-making rule that would mean a loss of Finland’s veto right in practice. 
The draft agreement was revised in a way that reassured Finnish constitutional concerns, but the 
case remains a precedent that shows that Finland only supports deepened integration when it is 
modelled to secure the formal rights of small member states.      
Concluding remarks 
There is a general perception in Finland that German leadership in EU affairs is strengthened by 
the need for crisis management and that Finland should carefully and sympathetically follow 
developments in German EU policy. The central role played by Germany in EU economic 
governance is deemed necessary and Germany’s substantial influence reasonable because of its 
economic strength. This perception is long-standing and was not borne out of the crisis. It has 
even been tentatively suggested that, as a small member state, Finland would prefer Germany 
single-handedly leading the Union over a constellation of large member states taking the lead.
13 
This is a contentious, even provocative, argument. Besides, Germany has never strived to 
dominate the EU but rather has sought to share a leadership role with France. What has 
nevertheless become clear during the past years of crisis management is that Franco-German 
domination of EU policy-making outside the community framework does not please Finnish 
decision-makers, who are often given take-it-or-leave-it choices. Such choices silence smaller 
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states and de-legitimise the usual methods of decision-making. This intergovernmental trend 
also challenges the legitimacy of national EU policy-making because of its emphasis on the 
strategic role of governments. Parliaments, or rather their EU committees, mainly approve pre-
negotiated decisions that are utterly difficult to change if they are based on a Franco-German 
compromise. 
As a result, Finland tends to demand respect for the established rules instead of promoting far-
reaching changes in either the EU’s economic or institutional set-up. To quote Minister for 
European Affairs and Foreign Trade Alexander Stubb: “We need strong rules, strong 
enforcement of rules, and a culture of rules.”
14 
 
                                                      
14 Stubb, op. cit., p. 4.  
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Conclusions: The Narcissism of Small Differences 
Almut Möller and Roderick Parkes
* 
s little as two years ago, this collection of essays would have seemed an act of extreme 
parochialism. Back then, the Lisbon Treaty had just come into force, and the talk was 
all about the European Union’s emergence as a global player. Examining member 
states’ relations to Germany would have been pure introspective indulgence. 
Since then, the European Union has indeed begun creating waves worldwide, but for the wrong 
reasons. Observers overseas ask how the EU-27 could embark on an ambitious project such as 
the Economic and Monetary Union without being ready to acknowledge the scale and the 
consequences of their undertaking, and without sufficiently knowing one another. What once 
would have counted as introspection has now – absurdly – become a matter of global 
importance. 
Against that background, the present collection offers a glimpse into the motivations and 
workings, not just of Germany, but of a whole range of member states. Within the space of an 
hour or two the general reader can gain quite a comprehensive overview of the internal 
dynamics that currently drive European relations. But many readers will come at the collection 
with a rather narrow motivation. Rather than seeking to understand a full range of EU member 
countries, many who download this paper will probably be most interested in reading only 
about their own.  
The rise of Euro-narcissism 
One of the most notable features of the debate about German European policy has been the 
prevalence of what might be termed national narcissism. Governments, politicians and 
commentators across the EU have delighted in raking up their domestic histories and examining 
what the current crisis says about them as a people.  
Narcissistic individualism has of course become a theme of modern living,
1 but there is nothing 
reassuring in the idea that Europolitics has now joined the mainstream. Whenever other walks 
of life have gone from being a cosy community of nobodies to the preserve of self-obsessed 
status-seekers, disaster has followed. A spirit of selflessness formerly gave groups, and indeed 
the European Union, sufficient cohesion to absorb unexpected challenges and enough modesty 
to turn back if their goals became dangerously unrealistic. No longer.
2  
The world’s narcissistic newcomers have proven notably crisis-prone. They are bad at risk-
planning, preferring grandiose goals that show little respect for those to whom they bear 
responsibility. They are bad at crisis management, delivering solutions where they excel rather 
than those that the community needs. And they are bad at post-crisis analysis, going to great 
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lengths to avoid criticism.
3 This seems as good a characterisation as any of the current state of 
European integration. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that European integration was always bound to foster 
this kind of unhealthy narcissism. Whilst ‘the commonalities’ amongst the EU-27 have been 
emphasised in communicating integration, the instinct of EU members is still to forge an 
identity by demarcating themselves from one another. European integration may even have 
reinforced the “narcissism of small differences” of which Freud warned. 
As these essays show, long-standing member states such as France, Italy and the UK have based 
their fragile sense of worth on the fact that they are not Germany. In this way, European 
integration was founded less on the goal of overcoming difference than on cementing them. 
Germany’s subsequent successes have been deeply troubling to its old partners, and the envy 
that drives their relations to the Federal Republic has stunted and distorted cooperation. 
Moreover, they have passed this inferiority complex on to newer member states: although these 
newer members have still not been admitted to all the EU’s clubs, they are nevertheless 
encouraged to view the rules and structures emanating from the EU as conducive to a sense of 
discipline which they themselves cannot hope to achieve on their own – a sentiment explored in 
the contributions on Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. 
It is no wonder that the Berlin speech delivered in November 2011 by the Polish Foreign 
Minister, and analysed in depth in the Polish contribution to this series, received such a positive 
reception. The Sikorski speech showed that, despite its dull and technical appearance, the EU is 
indeed a very human community. And the simple truth is that people respond well to 
encouragement and signs of mutual respect. 
Yet, moments such as the Sikorski speech are rare, and a recurrent theme in these essays is how 
difficult it has become to achieve mutual respect between governments, even – as in the Finnish 
case – amongst those that agree on the substance of policy. In the early years of European 
integration, when cooperation was indeed dull and technical and the stakes were relatively low, 
members could revel in grand shows of magnanimity and diplomacy. Today, with cooperation 
so much more advanced, the style and tone are altogether sharper. 
Lessons for narcissists 
How, then, to create a modern community based on mutual respect under such conditions? 
These essays provide a number of lessons: 
First, there is no point in being nostalgic for the old days of consensus-based Brussels decision-
making. Back then, mutual respect for national sensibilities was used primarily as a means to 
block action. This was the product of a very German conception of European integration, in 
which national sovereignty was shared in order to prevent hasty action. In the current political 
context, however, inaction is not an option. The euro and Schengen projects have created deep 
common goods, but without the flanking measures necessary to sustain them. Further 
cooperation will impinge upon core areas of national sovereignty, but it has become 
unavoidable. The member states must therefore find an imaginative form of mutual respect that 
promotes action rather than prevents it.  
Second, the emerging decision-making setup in Brussels – “the Union method” ascribed to the 
German Chancellor – lends itself unnecessarily to a regressive form of international relations. 
The assumption amongst its proponents is presumably that this re-weighting in favour of 
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intergovernmentalism implies a respect between governments. In reality, the pattern of 
intergovernmental negotiation, especially at the level of heads of state and government, is one 
of national point-scoring and power-plays. This is something brought out particularly strongly 
in the paper on the Czech Republic. If the larger member states are going to eschew the 
Commission and Parliament, they must be aware that this can lead to situations of dominance. 
The contribution on France suggests that the healthiest relations between France and Germany 
have often been based on disagreement rather than agreement, and thus on this powerful pair’s 
respect for diversity. 
Third, governments must be more open with one another about their own weaknesses. This is 
particularly clear in the case of Germany. There, the outward impression of a country with a 
strong model for solving the euro crisis belies Berlin’s acute awareness of the weaknesses of its 
plans. Germany knows full well that the rules of its Ordoliberalism cannot always be respected, 
but has failed to communicate their limitations. As the Romanian and Hungarian contributions 
to this volume highlight, the result is a suspicion that Germany is practising double standards; 
not so much in the sense that it contravenes the European rules that it promotes itself, but that it 
is selective in the member states it allows to break these rules. Germany, though, could justly 
retort that these countries have not been open about their own administrative and political 
weaknesses. 
Fourth, governments must be more open with the electorate about the true extent of their 
powers and free choices. The slogan of the current crisis, advocated strongly by the German 
Chancellor in both the domestic and European contexts, has been that “there is no choice”. This 
is a false proposition, since politics is the art of choice, and to deny that fact is to deny 
democracy. Indeed, if there has been a rise in populism throughout the EU, it is precisely 
because electorates feel that they can still change governments but that this will not change 
policy. An irresponsible domestic debate about EU politics is reported in Portugal, Spain, 
Greece and Germany itself. These unhealthy domestic characteristics in turn impinge upon 
governments’ international personalities, leaving governments inward-looking, aggressively 
assertive and with an inflated sense of entitlement – a style that does indeed reduce the available 
options. By contrast, and in an appeal to a more enlightened style of politics, the Romanian 
contribution highlights the inspiration once drawn from post-war Germany as regards political 
tolerance and democratic exchange. 
A German problem? 
Germany has played a central role in fostering the unfortunate style of European integration 
today. Many of the present papers report concerns about the Federal Republic’s unwillingness 
to communicate its position for fear of encountering criticism, about its failures of empathy, 
about its desire to cooperate only with those states which agree with it, about its sudden liking 
for power without recognising the concomitant responsibilities (not just in economic policy but 
also as regards relations with Russia), and about its overwhelming focus on itself.  
Such traits are typical of a true narcissist. But, if this is so, the other members must take their 
share of the blame for the situation. Narcissism arises when individuals are denied recognition 
or encouragement, leaving them unhealthily sensitive to the opinions of others and with a strong 
need to prove their worth. As numerous papers here suggest, other member states have found 
greater political advantage in persuading Germany of the dangers of self-assertion and 
‘normalisation’ than in encouraging it to become a responsible player in Europe – let alone 
pulling their own weight.  
This collection has, for example, outed Austria as something of a free-rider, with Vienna 
pretending that Berlin is playing just the kind of role it has always wanted, just so that it does 
not have to engage or help. That country, with perhaps the deepest relations to Germany, seems 
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the chapter on Bulgaria suggests, even those states which have offered encouragement to the 
Federal Republic probably do so for rather selfish reasons – hence Sofia’s praise for Germany’s 
‘unconditional solidarity’. 
Such emotional manipulation runs counter to the creation of a positive German presence in 
Europe. The opening contribution drawing on Gallup polling data suggests that Germany can be 
appreciated and respected for its leadership skills without necessarily being popular –indeed a 
certain degree of unpopularity may be a necessary condition of leadership. Yet, it will be a cruel 
process for Germany to liberate itself from the need to be liked, and other governments will be 
tempted to exploit Berlin’s continued neediness even if this in turn feeds the unhealthy state of 
European relations.  
With that danger in mind, all the member states, including Germany, should take note of a 
recurrent theme in these papers: this is Berlin’s moment, certainly, but it will be a fleeting one. 
Numerous essays refer to their country’s dependence upon the German economy, but at the 
same time recall that the Federal Republic was until recently the sick man of Europe. It all goes 
to show that Germany has no natural leadership position or authority in the EU; that its current 
weight reflects only the conjuncture of extraordinary domestic and international economic 
factors.  
In short, the way that Germany and the other member states treat one another now will have 
implications for their own treatment long after this moment has passed. This gives each a stake 
in fostering a generalised sense of mutual respect. 
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